Moderator:
Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies
Panelists:
Marti Dinerstein, President, Immigration Matters
Tom Wolfsohn, Senior Vice President of Government
Affairs and Communication, American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators (AAMVA)
Robert Rector, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Good morning. Im
Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies.
Here in the United
States theres
documentation, secure documents of identity, and in the case of immigration
work authorization and the status of your visa, what have you. Unfortunately,
the starting point of too much of the debate over secure identification is
three words:
Your papers, please.
It is the idea that any efforts to improve the integrity of identification
documents is the first step toward the SS knocking on your front door.
But those of you
who work in this building have Congressional IDs
that you showed as you passed security. Im
going to be flying to Atlanta Friday and Im
going to have to show my drivers
license over and over again before I board the plane. When you get a new job
you have to demonstrate your identity and your eligibility to work. Often,
sometimes, thats
done with the passport or its
done with two separate documents, with a drivers
license and a Social Security card.
So we have a system
of personal identification. It just isnt
very good. Before September 11th this was a problem, but it wasnt
really perceived as all that urgent. Illegal aliens used fraudulent documents
to get jobs. Peoples
identities were sometimes stolen because of low-quality identification
documents.
There was an
indication that this was a security concern after the attacks on the World
Trade Center and related early nineties terrorist attacks, such that Congress
in 1996 in the large immigration bill that it passed had a provision requiring
minimum standards for state drivers
license and for birth certificates. That was set to go into effect two years
later and right before it did that the provision was repealed, led by
Congressman Barr and others. So it really wasnt,
the issue just wasnt
seen as all that urgent.
After the September
11th attacks, our lax identification system came to be seen as a much bigger
problem than we had thought before, at least some of us had thought. The
hijackers had drivers
licenses from New Jersey and Florida and Virginia. That issue has continued to
resonate. The issue of drivers
licenses for illegal aliens has become politically important in several
states, in Tennessee and California for instance. The Social Security
Administration is now conducting a program to identify mismatched names and
numbers. Theres
a news story from the Post in the packets that we gave you.
Talk of national ID
cards or improving our identification system has reached a pretty high level.
The Oracle Corporation CEO Larry Ellison volunteered his services for no pay
to develop the national ID card, which is news in itself, I think. Alan
Dershowitz publicly wrote about the need for better identification. Senator
Durbin has introduced legislation, as have Congressmen Moran and Davis, to
improve the integrity of our identification system.
So it seemed like a
good idea to offer kind of an overview, a primer on this issue. Marti
Dinerstein is the author of the paper that were
releasing today that's in your packets,
Americas Identity
Crisis, and shes
going to present her comments about the three main identification documents
that we have, birth certificates, drivers
licenses, and Social Security numbers, and then some recommendation for
action.
The two people
responding to her paper and also talking generally on the issue of secure
documents will be Tom Wolfsohn, who is Senior Vice President of Government
Affairs and Communications at the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, an organization I confess I didnt
even know existed until last year, but has been around for almost 60 years and
is essentially all the DMV administrators from around the country.
The other
respondent will be Robert Rector, a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation
who has written extensively about welfare and welfare reform issues, but also
has written on the issue of the quality and integrity of our documentation
system.
So everybody will
have their chance to talk and then well
take questions from the audience. Marti?
PRESENTATION OF MARTI DINERSTEIN
MS. DINERSTEIN: Thank you, Mark, and good morning to all of you.
Id like to start by giving some background on why I wrote
Americas Identity Crisis. Those of us involved in the field of immigration
policy are well aware that at every level of government gaping loopholes exist
that have facilitated the growth of an illegal population that today numbers
over 8 million people. But it was clear after September 11th that the American
people were shocked to discover this.
They could not understand why people on short-term visas
were given drivers licenses. They were outraged that any foreign citizen with
enough cash could come to the United States, learn how to fly jet planes, and
receive rubber stamp authorization from the INS months after they finish their
training. They were perplexed why foreign students were permitted to study
here, but no one cared if they showed up for class. And they were dumbfounded
to discover that Saudi citizens could take advantage of a new customer service
program initiated by our embassy that permitted them to go to a local travel
agency, process their papers there, the travel agency then would forward them
to our embassy for approval, so the person applying for the visa never had to
see anyone at our embassy.
The list is longer, but you get the idea. I thought it
would be helpful to write a primer of sorts that the average American could
understand on how over 8 million illegal people can live in the United States
undetected and with little fear of exposure, much less punishment if their
illegal status is discovered.
One of the most important reasons why that can happen is
widespread document fraud. Ordinary documents like birth certificates, Social
Security numbers, drivers licenses, things that American citizens take for
granted, are prized possessions for illegal residents, who go to extraordinary
lengths to obtain them. Providing these false documents to millions of people
has become a large, sophisticated, and profitable business to unsavory
characters that use the same modus operandi as drug dealers and human
smugglers.
Our government has been slow to recognize this threat to
the integrity of our identity documents, for reasons I detail in my paper. But
as the size of the illegal population exploded during the last decade, some of
these issues attracted the attention of Congress and federal and state
government agencies. So the problems have been known for some time by people
with the authority to fix them. Their success record is poor.
A birth certificate is issued to every American essentially
when we emerge from the womb. They are not documents we think much about. I
have thought about it only once, when I needed it for a marriage license. But
it's one of the most important so-called breeder documents that allow illegal
residents to obtain Social Security numbers and driver's licenses.
All 50 states issue certified copies of birth certificates,
but so do 7,000 local registrars. These are home town offices staffed by
overworked clerks who are not thinking about deceit and fraud. If they get a
mailed-in request for a duplicate certificate, they assume that request is
valid and they mail the dupe, thus possibly turning an undocumented alien into
an American citizen.
Access to personal data contained in public records is of
mounting concern to lawmakers and privacy experts because of the issue of
identity fraud. Last December, in the name of public disclosure, an official
in Californias Health Services Department sold to a genealogical research
company for the sum of $1,500 the birth and death records of more than 24
million people who were born or died in the state between 1905 and 1995. The
data included names, birth dates, birth locations, and mothers maiden names,
the latter of which, as you know, is often a password for verifying by credit
card companies, health insurers, and the like. Following a blizzard of
complaints, the company voluntarily pulled the database. But its emblematic
of how clueless many government employees are as to the threat to our most
basic identity documents.
The ways to fix the security problems with respect to birth
certificates are well known. There should be mandated national standards for
issuing and providing certified copies. Both birth and death records should be
computerized so they can be matched. But this understandably is not a high
priority in states that are not responsible for enforcing federal immigration
laws.
However, a national effort was authorized by Congress in
1996 which designated the INS as lead agency to build a computer system that
would match interstate and intrastate birth and death certificates to help
stop identity fraud. More than 5 years later, little progress has been made.
This is unfortunate, as birth certificates are the first building block
illegal residents use in their quest for Social Security numbers and drivers licenses.
A Social Security number conveys legitimacy. A fraudulently
obtained one allows illegal residents to get a job, apply for a license, open
a bank account, and generally melt unnoticed into our society. I've detailed
six different ways they can be fraudulently obtained in my paper.
The Social Security Administration is well aware that
document fraud is rampant. It is their responsibility to inspect the
documentary evidence regarding age, identity, and legal status and they have
made progress. Its providing today its employees with a guide prepared by the
INS that highlights what to look for when inspecting documents. Its employees
have access to an online INS database to determine legal status. Safeguards
have been built into SSAs computers that permit them to flag transactions
with the greatest potential for fraud, like mailing ten or more numbers to the
same address within a six-month period, which happened.
Yet it has been reported that most, if not all, of the
September 11th hijackers had Social Security numbers. How? This may have been
because if an illegal alien invents a Social Security number, steals or
borrows an authentic card, or buys a counterfeit one, most likely the Social
Security Administration won't catch it without the aid of employers, and few
employers seem inclined to ffer that cooperation.
As we know, each year at tax time, employees earnings
records are sent to the IRS on W-2 forms. This year the Social Security
Administration has stepped up its effort to identify employees whose names
don't match their Social Security numbers. The purpose is to be sure that
individuals get the credit they deserve for their earnings. However, revealing
someones illegal status is sometimes a byproduct of that search. The Social
Security Administration plans to send out 750,000 such letters this year to
the nations 6.5 million employers, versus the 110,000 that they sent out in
2001.
Even though there can be innocent reasons for why a
mismatch occurs, the SSA acknowledges that there is rampant fraud among
the illegal community. They know this, but have no authority to levy fines
against employers, even those who are habitual offenders.
The IRS does have the authority to fine employers the sum
of $50 for every mismatched number and it can fine employees as well, $50.
Apparently it rarely does so. But this paltry sum would hardly have a
deterrent effect even if it were levied.
The trivialization of crimes committed by undocumented
aliens is widespread. We try to catch them at our borders. If we do not
succeed, increasingly they are given a free ride even if they break additional
laws while here. But the end game of this leniency is an illegal community
equal to the population of ten states.
We need to erect more firewalls to prevent illegal aliens
misuse of this simple nine-digit number that has become a pass key to the
American way of life. Possessing a Social Security card, however obtained,
greatly enhances the chances of receiving a valid driver's license, the most
widely accepted identification in the U.S. Indeed, it is our de facto national
identity card. I hesitate to even mouth those words because they provoke
heated debate on all sides of the political spectrum, so Ill happily leave
that quagmire for our other speakers to address.
But theres no doubt that a drivers license or motor
vehicle department-issued ID card is a key identity document all illegals
seek. My paper discusses how criminal middlemen have discovered that helping
people obtain licenses is a lucrative business.
Motor vehicle departments are duped daily by deceit and fraud by undocumented
aliens. But some states openly permit foreign nationals residing illegally in
the U.S. to obtain a valid drivers license. Examples are rife, but Ill
briefly mention just two.
In 2001 Tennessee had the dubious distinction of enacting a
law thought to be the nations most lenient for granting licenses to illegal
residents. According to media reports, more than 30,000 immigrants swamped
license testing centers in the first month after the law went into effect. A
supply of 17,000 copies of Spanish language driving manuals ran out in 8 days.
Lines started forming at dawn and resulted in such overcrowding that a fire
marshal cleared one station and a landlord yanked a lease in another. It
was reported that as many as 60 percent of the applicants failed the written
test and got right back into line to try again.
North Carolina also has a reputation for laxity on
verifying documents. A newspaper reported that 388,000 people hold North
Carolina licenses with the same Social Security number, 999-99-9999. Motor
vehicle clerks enter that number if applicants dont provide one. The
identification problems are so severe and so well known that Floridas
motor vehicle director took the extraordinary step of denying reciprocity to
North Carolina drivers.
To me, the fact that state governors and legislators would
openly subvert federal immigration law is the single most shocking and
disturbing fact in my research. A valid drivers license is the only ID one
needs to board a domestic flight. It is the only ID one needs to get into the
White House, assuming of course one has an appointment to go there.
Mandated national standards for drivers licenses are
urgently needed. The security features of licenses must be upgraded. A
common sense proposal is on the table that will be proposed by our next
that will be discussed by our next speaker.
I thought Id end by reading a news story dated May 9th.
This falls under the category of no one likes bad things to happen in their
neighborhood:
Immigration agents arrested 24 persons and seized counterfeit
documents and counterfeiting equipment yesterday in an operation designed to
disrupt the continuing false document open air markets in the Adams-Morgan
neighborhood of Washington, D.C. The men were arrested yesterday following the
execution of four search warrants at 2801 15th Street, Northwest, Washington,
D.C. Subsequent to the search, INS agents also seized 360 fake alien
registration cards, so-called
green cards,
281 fraudulent Social Security cards, 70 bogus employment authorization cards,
46 counterfeit drivers
licenses from California, Utah, and Florida, and other equipment believed to
be used in the production of the fraudulent documents.
Document fraud is pervasive and pernicious throughout the
United States, particularly in areas that have large illegal communities. Even
though the vast majority of them wish us no ill, they are nonetheless doing
harm by degrading the integrity of our documentation system. We are living in
a dangerous world and America is a target. We can no longer tolerate the
laissez faire attitude that threatens our ability to distinguish illegal
aliens from U.S. citizens.
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Marti. Mr. Wolfsohn next.
PRESENTATION
OF TOM WOLFSOHN, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS
MR.
WOLFSOHN:
The drivers license is the most commonly used form of
identification in the United States. Probably for most of you, except the
unfortunate few who are heavy-footed, you may have never used it really for
driving purposes. Youve used it to enter federal buildings, youve used it to
get library cards, to rent an automobile, to board an airplane.
As Marti indicated, the system in the United States for
issuing cards and the cards themselves is broken. Processes, procedures, and
documents are not secure. 265 million people over the age of 15 in the U.S.
and Canada have either a state or provincial-issued drivers license or ID
card. But over the years states and provinces have passed a variety of laws
dealing with the drivers license and in turn those have been interpreted
really in a patchwork of regulations at the state and provincial level,
resulting really in a myriad of processes and procedures to implement them.
It is really a highly exploitable system, full of
loopholes. Today problem drivers are able to spread their convictions from
state to state to state. Criminals use these cards to commit identity fraud
and identity theft, the fastest growing crime in the United States according
to the Federal Trade Commission, and, as Mark and Marti indicated, 18 of the
19 al Qaeda hijackers had either state-issued drivers license or ID cards or
counterfeit drivers licenses. It is too easy to shop around in the United
States and Canada and find the weakest link, as those busloads of undocumented
aliens did in Tennessee, only one example.
Im here representing the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators. Our members are the chief administrators of state,
provincial motor vehicle agencies, U.S. and Canada, most of them appointed by
their governors. Their agencies are funded by their legislatures. Our
membership also includes the senior law enforcement officials in those
jurisdictions responsible or highway safety.
AAMVA has been working on this issue for many years really
for highway safety and identity fraud goals. Mark mentioned the 1996
Immigration Reform Act, which was subsequently repealed by privacy
advocates. The 1998 Safe Highway Act, introduced by Representatives Moran and
Morella following the death of the very promising young 17 year-old Bethesda
resident, Benjamin Cooper, who was killed by a dump truck driven by a driver
who had a wallet full of drivers licenses from various states and had put
together, I guess, around 20-odd moving violations spread over those
various states in the previous 10 years. Unfortunately, that Act was not
passed.
Of course, the reason were here today? After 9-11 drivers
license and ID security became a homeland security issue. Our association in
October put together a task force. Recommendations were issued in January. In
February we convened a leadership summit, invited our members and
various stakeholders. Right now were working with 13 different working groups
who are really kind of putting meat on the bones of the recommendations,
adding the detail that will be necessary to implement them.
Right off the bat, I want to tell you that were not
seeking a national ID card. Were simply recommending measures to strengthen
the security of the state government license and ID card. Were not seeking a
federal mandate, but rather a partnership, recommending that the states
through AAMVA develop minimum standards for homeland security and advocate
that the federal government adopt them.
We certainly respect the states role. We are in fact a
state government organization. State governments have validated this process
in other applications. The American Association of State Highway
Transportation Officials, for example, AASHTO, the states through AASHTO, have
set minimum federal standards for highway safety. We think that state
officials don't want to issue a driver's license to the next terrorist any
more than they want to approve the next substandard bridge.
There are eight task force recommendations. First, improve
and standardize the initial issuance process. That would include the
development and implementation of DRIVerS. Its a system that would allow each
state to query the driver records of another state and verify the applicant's
identity, not calling for any more information than is already contained in
the driving record and no other application except to verify identity.
Motor vehicle agencies already exchange driver histories
with commercial licenses and have done it for nearly 15 years through CDLIS.
In all that time there have been no privacy concerns with CDLIS, no
allegations of invasion of privacy. It contains 10 million commercial driver
records. In a recent 4-year period it kept nearly 900,000 potentially
dangerous commercial drivers off the road. It is a pointer system. It is not a
mega-database. It cannot function as a database. It simply allows one state to
access the driver records in another state.
In a report last year, DOT said both the commercial driver
system and the national driver registry could be folded into a system to
include both passenger and commercial licenses, DRIVerS.
Second, standardize the definition of residency. It was a
critical factor in the hijackers success. Today in the U.S. and Canada, 64
different definitions of residency, the states, provinces, and
territories.
Third and the principal subject we are here today for,
establish uniform procedures for serving non-citizens. If we dont, I think
one of the first things were going to see is that drivers license
reciprocity which we enjoy today, moving from one state to another, simply
handing over your driver's license and getting a new one from the new state,
would disappear.
Fourth, implement processes to produce a secure card to
uniquely identify an individual. The lack of standard security features allows
individuals to easily tamper with or counterfeit cards. On the Internet today
I think there are 40 or 50 different sites where one can get drivers
licenses, birth certificates, Social Security cards. Theyre advertised as
novelties. They dont deliver the product; they download a template and then
the individual with a computer printer and a digital camera produces the
document. We intend to work with private industry and DOT and other
stakeholders to recommend a combination of biometric identifiers
fingerprints, digital photographs, retinal scans
plus security
features, some overt, some covert. These would be encrypted both in the card
and would be contained in the driver record in the state database in order to
more effectively distribute them and to combat the bad guys, frankly.
Fifth, establish methods to prevent and detect fraud and
audit the issuance process. Source or breeder documents, which Marti
mentioned, are used to verify identity when someone applies for a
license. In some states there are as many as 25 different documents that one
can use. The problem is that we use the same documents that the Social
Security Administration uses, that the IRS uses, that the State Department
uses. It's really circular.
You use a Social Security card to get a drivers license.
You use a drivers license to get a birth certificate. You use a birth
certificate to get a Social Security card. We need to shorten the number of
acceptable documents, make that uniform across the states, and then provide
intensive training for fraudulent document inspectors.
Just to give you an idea of the scope of the problem that
really is faced every day by front-line employees in the DMVs: there are over
240 different valid forms of the drivers license in this country and Canada.
Who could keep track of the real ones, much less the fake ones? Ive seen a
couple of numbers. Ive used the lower one
6,000 different versions of the
birth certificate in the U.S. issued by local and county governments, 27
different INS identity cards, 40 different versions of the Social Security
card out there today.
We also think that the DRIVerS system should interface with
the Social Security Administration, INS, vital statistics, birth and death
records, FBI and other agencies to enhance the ability to verify identity.
Sixth, ensure greater enforcement priority and increased
penalty for credential fraud. Internal fraud is a big problem in motor vehicle
agencies. They on the one hand produce a lot of revenues for the states. On
the other hand, the front-line employees are among the lowest paid in state
government and are ripe for fraud. We really need to, first, have better
internal audits, better quality control, and then ratchet up the penalties for
internal fraud.
I mentioned the availability over the Internet of
counterfeit documents. Theyre also readily available in the underground
market. Weve all seen too many stories of teenagers obtaining counterfeit
licenses, purchasing alcohol, and really tragic results.
Seven, what were doing right now is seeking federal
requirements for legislation. AAMVA is not a regulatory body. We operate under
self-regulation. We promote standards, best practices, uniformity. We have no
enforcement power. Self-regulation is really difficult if your goal is to get
100 percent compliance from the states. Without 100 percent participation, the
drivers license framework is going to continue to be full of loopholes.
Therefore, for the first time since 1933 this organization is seeking a
federal partnership.
A couple bills out there right now. The Durbin bill,
we worked with Senator Durbin, providing technical advice since the fall.
There was a hearing April 16th. We participated along with a number of other
stakeholders
governors, chiefs of police, state chief information officers,
and others. We understand that a draft will be out, if not introduced, in the
near future, likely to be co-sponsored by Senators Collins and Schumer. It
would improve the reliability of the license, enhance highway safety, verify
personal identity, would establish DRIVerS, would require the DOT Secretary to
work with the states through AAMVA to set minimum standards, would require
audits of the DMVs to determine compliance with regulations.
The Secretary of DOT would submit a biannual report on
these audit results. It would require the states to participate in a compact,
the Driver's License Agreement
I understand I'm running out of time
would amend the Driver Privacy and Protection Act.
Jeff Flake introduced legislation that passed the
Immigration Subcommittee barring federal agencies from accepting a drivers
license from states that dont match the expiration date of the immigration
documents to the license. The Moran-Davis bill would require computer chips to
be embedded in the card.
A recent survey implemented by AAMVA indicates that 77
percent of respondents favor Congressional action to modify the licensing
process and heighten security. Opposition to federal legislation comes from
privacy advocates who fear a national ID card and invasion of privacy,
immigrants rights groups, and state organizations concerned about states
rights, federalization of the state-issued driver's license.
We think we will have reached success when public
perception of our goals is positive, we have support from federal and state
officials, the appropriations necessary to make this happen are awarded, we
have nationwide participation and the passage of federal legislation.
Thank you.
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Thank you,
Tom. Bob?
PRESENTATION
OF ROBERT RECTOR, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
MR.
RECTOR:
What Im going to speak about today outlines some of the
recommendations that the Heritage Foundation has made in its counterterrorism
work over the last 6 months. But let me begin by just making two very
simple points that are often lost in this debate.
The first is that a nation with 7 million illegal
immigrants is a nation that is wide open to devastating terrorism. A nation
that makes no serious effort to discern whether people are in the nation
legally or illegally and essentially allows with virtually no counteracting
effort whatsoever people to come into the country and pretend to be here
legally, and that has no mechanism, no viable mechanism for discerning whether
or not they are here legally, is a nation that simply does not take terrorism
seriously, and I think that's the situation that we are in as a nation today.
The second fundamental problem is, or the second
fundamental point, is how many of you -- would you raise your hand if you have
a drivers license on you?
(A show of hands.)
How many of you use a drivers license for routine sort of
business activities, like opening up bank accounts or renting an apartment?
Have you ever used one like that?
(A show of hands.)
The reality is, gee, youre all carrying government ID. We
dont have a national ID system. We have a 50-state ID system. I didnt really
fully understand this until I found out that in fact all of the 50 states
issue drivers IDs to people who are not drivers. If youre not a driver, if
you're medically impaired and you can't drive, you can't function in our
society without one of these ID cards, so the states will issue you a
non-drivers drivers ID so that you can function.
The state governments are totally in the business of
issuing government IDs and no lawful citizen can get by in our society
without these ID cards, and if you took them away we would simply collapse.
You couldnt do ordinary business. You couldnt go to the bank. You couldnt
rent a car
all of these things.
But we have to have some ID system to do that. Fortunately,
while this ID system works fairly well and is not a threat to most lawful
people, its also an ID system which is perfectly amenable and useful to
anyone who wants to commit fraud. It's simply not any mechanism for stopping
people who want to come into the United States, pretend to be someone that
they're not, and then do something grievously harmful to American citizens.
So we have effectively a 50-state ID system. We use it. We
anticipate that it in fact validates ID. When you use an ID or when youve
seen someone presenting an ID at an airport or something, you have an implicit
assumption that this is in fact telling the airline something, that this
person is who he purports to be.
But it doesnt do that at all. In fact, its almost
specifically designed not to do that. If you want to get around it, get a
false ID and pretend to be someone that youre not. No problem; its designed
to facilitate that.
So what I would like to outline here just very briefly
and my remarks will be very similar to those that Mr. Wolfsohn outlined,
although somewhat simpler
what would an ID system, a 50-state ID system
that would deter terrorism and would prevent the use of false IDs, what would
that look like? I would call this a secure fraud-proof identity system. We
have an identity system now. The question is can this identity system be made
fraud-resistant or fraud-proof, or do we just want to have an ID system that
basically could be exploited by anyone who wants to have a fraudulent
identification.
The first element of a secure identity system is what I
would call tripod-based identity cards. There are three elements to this. The
first element is a card that has on the card some type of an electronically
readable biometric identifier. Lets just use a fingerprint now, but it could
be a digitized photo or something like that. So thats the first element of
the tripod.
The second element of the tripod is your actual
fingerprint. The third element of the tripod is an electronic database that
says indeed there is such a person with this name who has this ID and who has
this fingerprint. So when you go to present your ID at some point, like say an
airport, you put it in, you use the biometric identifier, you put your
fingerprint down, it says: Aha, the fingerprint does indeed match the card and
the card matches the electronic database.
Is this farfetched? No, this is in fact the system that the
Army and the military already have this system and it works quite, quite well.
It is impossible to use a purely counterfeit ID using that kind of system
because you not only have to produce the ID, you have to go in and somehow
modify the electronic database at the same time, so that youre altering that.
Thats going to be very, very hard for someone to do. This is a very, very
good system and it is a system that we will ultimately adopt. The question is
whether we adopt it soon or whether we wait until several radiological bombs
go off in downtown D.C. and then we decide that maybe we ought to do something
serious about his kind of stuff.
The first point that we have recommended is that all visas
for people coming into the United States should be based on this technology,
all visas. That in and of itself is an amazing deterrent factor. What this
would mean is that if you were applying for a visa to come into the United
States at the application process were going to take your fingerprint and
were going to take a digitized photo of you.
I wonder how many members of al Qaeda are interested in the
application process of coming in and having the United States government take
their fingerprints and a digitized photo of them. I think in and of itself
that is a massive deterrent to international terrorism. Since we would be
requiring other nations also to use these sorts of systems in terms of visas
coming into the United States, it would have a similar deterrent effect that
would spread widely.
Secondly, we think that the internal drivers license, if
its to have any validity, or the state-issued license also, ought to have
this tripod base of the biometric identifier and linked into a computer system
so that you can determine that it is in fact a valid license rather than
something that has been printed off in somebody's basement someplace.
If you are comfortable with getting on planes with
people that have IDs printed in someones basement, fine. But I think that is
probably not where we need to go in the future.
Now, that would ensure that in fact each ID that is used in
the United States for purposes such as renting a car, renting an apartment,
and getting on an airplane would have to be a valid ID that matches up against
an electronic database and prevents fraud. Now, the second tier of defense
then is to prevent people from obtaining such IDs under fraudulent premises.
Ill just go into how we think this could be done in terms of a drivers
license or similar state-issued ID.
To sort of simplify the point here, what we think is that
anyone who comes in to get a drivers license or similar state ID should need
to present either a valid fraud-proof visa or a birth certificate
demonstrating or a naturalization certificate demonstrating citizenship. That
is two categories of people. Anybody that cant do either of those things
shouldn't be getting an ID, a state-issued ID, because they shouldnt be here.
The problem then is with the birth certificates, which are
fairly easy to duplicate and theyre fairly difficult to verify that theyre
in fact authentic. Theres a fairly simple step, I think, to double check on
that, which is when someone presents a birth certificate to obtain a driver's
license you would have to go back to the initial issuing agency, which I
gather is not done in most states, and say, okay, heres Sam Jones, he says
that he was born in Chattanooga in 1962; was there in fact a Sam Jones born in
Chattanooga? This is heavy stuff here. Is there actually such a person?
Then you find out that there was such a person, and then I
think you need a secondary check that would say, well, has Sam Jones currently
got a drivers license someplace else? How many Sam Joneses do we have in the
United States that were born in Chattanooga on this date and have this Social
Security number? That secondary check would make it much more difficult for
someone to try to piggyback onto an authentic U.S. citizen pretending to be
that person with a fraudulent birth certificate in order to get a duplicate,
to get a license.
I also think that this is sort of self-auditing
electronically, that if you go through and you can electronically
and this
requires making additional databases or making the databases interface better,
but if you could say, heres a person who has applied for a drivers license,
we're now double checking against the birth records to indicate that this
person was in fact born where he is, and now were double checking other
records to see whether in fact theres a Sam Jones in some other state who
appears over there, and if you also
you could make the photographs
available and shared in the database and now you could see whether the Sam
Jones who was applying for a driver's license in New York looks like he same
Sam Jones who has used that birth certificate to apply and obtain a drivers
license at previous points in other states.
It would be able to be audited fairly easily and I think
would also take away a lot of the potential for internal fraud.
What you would have then with a system like that is that
everyone in the United States who carries one of the government IDs which
were all carrying, we would have a system for verifying that that person was
in fact who he claims to be, was in fact someone who is lawfully in the United
States, and was not here unlawfully, and that when that person uses that
government-issued ID for any type of transaction we would have a much greater
sense that in fact the ID was valid.
The whole point of an ID is that its supposed to give
external assurance that when you present it you are in fact the individual
that is on the card and that you have some lawful status in this country that
is in some sense recorded by that card.
Although we have a government ID system, our current
government ID system simply does not do that and because it does not it leaves
us very vulnerable to all kinds of horrible things that will potentially take
American lives and devastate our economy in ways that are currently
unimaginable. I think that we have to move forward with this type of system.
It is not as complicated as I think it seems on the surface. I think that its
inevitable that our nation will have this, and people that say that we won't
or shouldn't are sort of like the people that resisted having photos on
drivers
IDs in the first place, which there was resistance to that.
Its absolutely essential if we are to take the war against
terrorism seriously that we be able to discern whether or not someone is in
our country lawfully and that we be able to take serious steps to prevent
people from entering unlawfully and moving around this country when they
should not be here.
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Bob.
Let me take the moderator's prerogative and just ask the
first question. That is, the apparent conflict between the fact that, for
instance, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, has made very
strong recommendations on document security and, on the other hand, some of
the legislation that Tom pointed to is sponsored, to the extent there are
Republican co-sponsors at all, seem to be liberal Republicans. There doesnt
seem to be in Congress a conservative constituency for secure documentation,
and in fact, Congressman Barr led the effort to repeal the measures passed in
1996.
I was just wondering if somebody wanted to comment on how
this gets done because of this apparent lack of enthusiasm among Republicans
for secure documentation.
MR. RECTOR:
What you have now apparently among conservatives is a kind of schizophrenia on
this issue, where you could find the same individual who is absolutely adamant
about not wanting illegal aliens to come in and issuing fraudulent documents
to illegal aliens and adamant about the dangers of international terrorism, I
am not going to name any names here, but at the same time has great paranoia
about a national ID card.
I think that the issue here is really one of knowledge. I
really think that the first and foremost important thing for a rational
discussion on this is to go back to that point I made, that the states issue
ID cards to American citizens who are not drivers. They are already more than
hip-deep in the process of issuing identity cards. It's not necessary that the
federal government do this. In fact, its not feasible that the federal
government do it. But it is, I think, necessary for the federal government to
coordinate certain minimum standards, so that the ID cards which we all use
and which we find absolutely necessary to our lives are, in fact, real ID
cards and cannot be exploited by people who want to hurt us in a very routine
and simple way, that the ID card does in fact establish lawful residence, does
establish that the person is someone who should be here, an individual who he
purports to be by carrying the card.
Once its put in those terms, I think a lot of the
polarization on the issue will dissipate. But I dont
think weve
advanced our knowledge and understanding of the issue far enough so far.
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Questions? Please identify yourself.
MR.
McALPIN: I'm K.C. McAlpin. I just wanted to ask from the
perspective of someone outside the country who who wanted to come into the
country, engage in identity fraud, or some foreign terrorists that wanted to
come into the United States to cause havoc, could you design a better and more
compliant system for them than the system we already have so far as drivers
licenses and the identity documents weve
been talking about?
In other words,
what Im
trying to ask in the question is, as I see it theres
absolutely no practical deterrence at all. Im
reminded about this when I go across the street from the building I work in
and they ask me for my drivers
license going into the building, which is a security measure, and yet Im
perfectly aware of how completely easy it would be for a terrorist to walk in
that building with a drivers
license and plant a bomb there. So that its
really just a harassment type of thing, the value that that has, because of
the lack of control.
It just seems to me
it would be mind-boggling when we have such a completely open system that is
so easily abused by people.
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Whats
the question, K.C.?
MR.
McALPIN:
The question is, I guess the
real question is, do you see
the public seems to be in favor of even going to a national ID. In the polls
that I saw, they say this hesitancy in Congress to do something is not
matched. The public understands, like I do, perfectly well that threats exist
to their safety and wellbeing. Why is there still this reluctance in Congress
to move forward on the issues?
MR. RECTOR: If the fundamental
question is does the current visa and ID system offer any actual deterrence to
people coming into the country fraudulently, I think the answer is absolutely
not. There are many other problems in terms of border security, but I think
that its
almost a pure accident if you catch someone coming into the United States on a
fraudulent visa. We do it, but if you actually look at the cases and things
it's because the border guard said: Hey, he looked really nervous. There's no
real system there. That was the guy who was going to blow up
MR.
KRIKORIAN: LAX.
MR.
RECTOR: He looked nervous. Well, thats
nice. Im
glad that the border guard was alert enough to notice that the guy looked
nervous. Maybe we can do a little better. Marti?
MS.
DINERSTEIN: Let me just amplify what Robert just said. The INS
estimates that 40 percent of the people that are here illegally came in on
visas, so at least they were legal at one point. 60 percent of the people here
illegally are basically border jumpers. They came in, no one ever knew their
name.
Increasingly, because of human
smuggling and the brilliant criminal thinking that goes into it, people are
getting into our ports, etcetera, and its
a huge problem. So I totally agree that we should do everything that we need
to to tighten up on visas. But some of the things that we talked about earlier
in terms of protecting against things once people are here, that is really
equally important.
MR. WOLFSOHN: I think the concern in
Congress probably is centered around three different issues: one, concern
really on the left and the right about creation of a national identification
system, about potential invasion of privacy; two, concern about the rights of
immigrants; and three, concern about states
rights and the "federalization," quote unquote, of the state-issued drivers
license.
MR.
KRIKORIAN: Anyone else? Yes.
MR.
HOPKINS: Scot Hopkins. I work for Congressman Bartlett.
One of the famous maxims in
Social Security is that your security system is only as strong as its weakest
link, and I see weve
talked about a lot of legislation thats
before the Congress in terms of driver's licenses, but one of the primary
documents that you use to get a drivers
license, which can be very secure through federal legislation, is a birth
certificate and we havent
talked at all about any legislation regarding standardization or some sort of
system that would create a highly integrated method of making sure that birth
certificates are in fact real and can be used to get drivers
licenses.
What would your recommendation
be in that area?
MS.
DINERSTEIN: I would advise Congress to go back and look at the law
that was passed in 1996 where they did do that. But there has been little
follow-up. Congress has a short attention span, and if its
not -- and I dont
mean that with any disrespect; theyve
got a lot of things that they need to do. I think follow-up is a
problem. Also whats
a big problem is that the INS was designated as the lead agency to follow
through on what Congress authorized. But we can talk later if youd
like specifics, but basically a lot of it is there. It just has never been
implemented.
MR.
RECTOR: I think that some of the discussion on this is to try to
create a more fraud-resistant physical birth certificate. I think that is
really
and I can stand to be corrected on this, but I think that's really not
the key issue. The more important issue is the one that I said, that when you
present a birth certificate in order to get a more usable document, which is
the driver's license, there is no check to say is this for real.
In order to do that, the
details I dont
fully understand, but you need to have a database that you can check it
against. Then you also have to be able to check it against death records to
make sure that they didnt
go into a graveyard and find, aha, heres
somebody thats
about my age and they died; now Ill
use their birth certificate. You also have to be able to go and see how many
other people are claiming to be this person and are currently walking around
with drivers
license claiming to be this same person. Thats
the way that you make the birth certificate more valid, I think, by this
double checking against other databases to make sure that there, one, was a
person like that; two, that the person is still alive as far as we can
determine; and three, that this person is not a lawful resident across the
country someplace else carrying a drivers
license and if you look at his photograph he doesnt
look anything like the person that