The process through which the Senate's immigration bill was developed and amendments for it were considered and discarded at a rapid pace is unfolding in the context of a genuine trust crisis in the American civic culture.
Over the past half-century, Americans have become increasingly distrustful and skeptical of their government, especially at the national level.
In 1958 the number of people who said they could trust the government to do what's right all or most of the time stood at 73 percent. By 1997, just 39 percent felt they could trust the government all or some of the time. And in 2013, that number has fallen to just 26 percent.
That is a dismal and disturbing record, but what accounts for it? Of course, the United States has accumulated a lot of political, cultural, and economic history in those years. Some of it has been positive, some of it less so. But the decline in public trust has been relentless.
One could argue that the high levels of public trust in the Eisenhower years reflected post-war naivety. Since then, the public has experienced the harsh lessons of assassinations, riots, economic downturns, and meltdowns, vast but ineffective Great Society programs, terrorist attacks, inconclusive wars, and a stubborn recession that has failed to respond to government policies. It would be easy to make the argument that all these, and other experiences that could be added to the list, have doubtlessly had a damaging effect on the trust in government numbers. And that would be true — in part. But those events, as damaging as many have been, are not the real cause of the decline.
Well, if it's not the events that have caused the decline in trust, then what has?
The answer is leaders' and governments' response to the events.
It appears that, contrary to the assumption of widespread and irredeemable public skepticism about government, the public is able to give credit where they think it's due. So, for example, one of the highest rebounds in public trust in government occurred right after 9/11. This was not merely a rally around the president for any decisive action, but a response to President Bush's specific initiatives and policies.
How do we know this? Well, the Roper Center asked, specifically. They noticed the clear spike in public trust after 9/11 that almost every major polling organization had found, but went on to ask a most profound question: Trust in government ... to do what?
They asked two questions that have major implications for today's immigration debate. First, in January 2002, four months after 9/11 and in the midst of G.W. Bush's response to those events, they asked: "When it comes to handling national security and the war on terrorism, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right? Would you say just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" Sixty-eight percent of the public responded "just about always" or "most of the time". They clearly favored President Bush's specific responses and felt confident they would be effective (the trust element).
A plausible inference would be that the specific trust levels associated with the president's national security actions after 9/11 would account for the general rise in public trust.
However, that inference would be wrong.
In that same survey, Roper asked: "When it comes to handling social issues like the economy, health care, Social Security, and education, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right? Would you say just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?"
In an almost reverse mirror response, 61 percent of the public responded "only some of the time" or volunteered "never".
Given these results, it seems clear, that:
- Generalized public trust and confidence are built on the aggregation of the public's views on specific policies, although questions dealing with those specifics are not often asked;
- The public is perfectly able to distinguish one set of policy domains from another in its evaluations, if it is asked; and
- Even when other areas have taken an upward tick in response to specific policies that seem to meet the public test of effectiveness and appropriateness, the government has gotten continuing low marks for issues like the economy, health care, Social Security, and education.
No discussion of the importance of immigration reform to America's trust crisis would be even minimally complete without examining more closely President Obama's contribution to it.
Next: President Obama's Trust Deficit
