Can We Control the Border? A Look at Recent Efforts in San Diego, El Paso and Nogales

Tucson is the Border Patrol sector headquarters that is responsible for most of the Arizona border — all but the portion covered

by Yuma, at the border with California. The only major border crossing point for legal and illegal immigration is at Nogales, about 60 miles south of Tucson. Tucson sits astride the major east-west interstate highway (I-10) and where the only major route from Nogales (I-19) intersects with that highway.

The generally barren land in this area suggests that border control should be fairly straightforward. However, anecdotal information points to a significant illegal alien problem in Tucson, which

would appear to belie the effectiveness of the Border Patrol in this sector. The INS, drawing on experience with the 1986 IRCA legalization program (in which about 83,000 illegal aliens applied from Arizona), census data and other indicators, estimated that by 1992 the approximate number of illegal aliens in Arizona had risen to about 57,000. Of this number, the INS estimated that over 80 percent were Mexicans.

Apprehension data for the two Arizona border sectors reflect different patterns (see Figure 11). The Tucson sector, which accounts for the greater number of apprehensions, has witnessed an escalating number of attempted illegal entries at both the border (Nogales) and in the interior. Yuma, on the other hand, appears to have been immune to similar pressures.

The greatest increase in apprehensions occurred after the El Paso border control operation was launched in September 1993. This suggests that Nogales became the secondary target for would-be illegal immigrants who were deterred by Operation Hold-the-Line's effectiveness. The average increase in apprehensions in FY-94 was about 2,000 higher than would have been expected from the rate of escalating apprehensions before the El Paso operation (see Table 2). The total increase of 4,000 apprehensions is a significant amount of dislocation. It is evidence of the effectiveness of the prevention strategy at El Paso for the overall border control effort to deter illegal immigrants, if that strategy can be replicated along the entire border.

The decrease in apprehensions in the Yuma sector is somewhat surprising. It goes against the trend in increased pressure on the Border Patrol elsewhere on the border. The data on personnel levels during this same period of time do not reflect any decreased level of effort. The implication is that either the Border Patrol is so effective in this sector that alien smugglers steer clear of it, or that the sector is simply so unattractive to would-be illegal immigrants that they do not try their luck in this area. In either case, the Yuma sector merits a closer look.

Observations — On visiting Nogales and extensively observing the border downtown as well as in outlying areas, it was readily apparent that there would be little challenge to illegal entry into either Mexico or the United States given the current state of border fencing. There were numerous holes in the fence, and some entire sections that had been torn down to accommodate vehicular access. During a tour of this region with a Border Patrol agent, Mexicans freely crossed into the United States in order to pick up supplies they presumably had purchased. Residents noted that anything that was not bolted down was likely to disappear.

The loose semblance of control was true also in the downtown area. Within about 15 yards of a legal entry point — and within full view of anyone working at that point — there was a hole that had been cut in the fence, reportedly earlier in the day, and there were a half-dozen persons on the Mexican side of the fence presumably looking for an opportunity to make a dash through the informal portal. A short distance further on is a railroad point of entry with steel gates that are opened periodically to admit a train, and, officials said, the train is always accompanied by a number of aliens on board or on foot trying to take advantage of the opportunity to avoid detection and apprehension.

Although the local Border Patrol agents seemed resigned to this lack of control, it was encouraging to note efforts are underway to upgrade border security. Part of the new capability is in the form of surveillance equipment and part is new secure fencing. The fencing operation faces hurdles, such as awaiting the results of environmental impact studies and negotiating with landowners for the right to place equipment on their land that abuts the frontier.

OPERATION GATEKEEPER:
MIXED RESULTS FROM A MIXED OPERATION

"We expect we will be able to secure the entire southwest border during this program. We do have a plan for activities in El Paso and San Diego to meet up. We intend to close the entire border [to illegal immigrants, a goal] many thought impossible."

The inauguration of Operation Gatekeeper at San Diego was accompanied by a blitz of publicity by the Clinton Administration — unlike the embarrassed silence that characterized the initiation of Operation Hold the Line. The California initiative was announced on the eve of the November elections, and it joined the hot political debate about illegal immigration that was fueling support for Proposition 187. The Administration said that an effective border control effort, such as Operation Gatekeeper, was the correct way to deal with the problem of illegal immigration rather than the initiative to restrict taxpayer-funded services to them.

This effort in San Diego would catch neither Washington nor Mexico City by surprise, as had the El Paso initiative. The new border control effort was not just advertised in advance, but it was as much the culmination of a series of efforts as it was the initiation of new measures. Both increased personnel commitments and a major infusion of high-technology equipment preceded the announced beginning of the operation. In addition, the new strategy coincided with the completion of the new border fence that had been begun during the Bush Administration and the installation of a significant amount of new stadium-type lighting, which facilitated night-time control efforts.

It is also noteworthy that Operation Gatekeeper was announced as a temporary measure. Clearly the infrastructure development was a permanent addition to the Border Patrol's deterrent capability. What may be subject to termination at the end of the current INS review of the operation's effectiveness — if that should be the recommendation — is not clear. It is clear, however, that if the decision should be to continue the operation as a permanent effort, some arrangements will need to be made to obtain on a permanent basis night vision equipment that was loaned by the Department of Defense to the INS for Operation Gatekeeper.

Has Operation Gatekeeper Been Successful? — To answer this question it is necessary to look at the criteria for success the operation incorporated and to ask whether these constitute a valid standard. San Diego Border Patrol Chief Gus de la Viña (since promoted to INS Regional Director) has insisted that the nature of the San Diego terrain and the profile of the would-be illegal entrant are such that an El Paso-style operation could not be mounted in San Diego.

There clearly is a difference in terrain between the two locations. El Paso is largely flat in the metropolitan section of the border, whereas sections of the San Diego border are extremely hilly. The complicated San Diego terrain affects both fence-building — although that now has been overcome — and road-building for patrolling the fence. Without vehicular mobility in places such as Smugglers Gulch in the Imperial Beach area, the Border Patrol is forced to apprehend illegal border crossers on foot or wait for them to proceed further away from the border to where the terrain is less of a factor.

Similarly, with regard to the profile of the intending illegal immigrant, the Chief's observation appears to be valid. In 1994, El Paso's Chief Reyes raised the question of the replicability of his success in San Diego because of the greater desperation of illegal crossers there. He was referring to the fact that many of the illegal crossers he was apprehending and deterring with Operation Hold the Line were local crossers, whose home is in Ciudad Juárez, unlike San Diego, where a majority are from inland points in Mexico and have undertaken a major effort, and cost in some instances, to get into the United States. The implication was that the latter would not be as easily dissuaded by a new posture by the Border Patrol. This is also the point that de la Viña makes.

Before attempting to answer the question of the efficacy of the Operation Gatekeeper strategy, it is useful to look at the results of the first five months of the operation and how they relate to the longer-term pattern of illegal entry (see Figure 12). The apprehension level and the personnel resources dedicated to the new profile are significantly different than those in El Paso.

Both El Paso and San Diego had a similar amount of personnel resources (9,000-10,000 agent-days) during FY-91 and FY-92. In FY-93, San Diego's level of effort increased by about one-quarter. This increase seems appropriate given the higher numbers of illegal crossers at San Diego. For example, San Diego in FY-93 accounted for 43.8 percent of all southwest border apprehensions, compared with 23.5 percent for El Paso.

That increased personnel capability in San Diego declined by about 15 percent during FY-94 and then increased again after the start of Operation Gatekeeper by slightly over one-quarter. El Paso increased its level of effort by over 15 percent at the outset of Operation Hold the Line, but quickly dropped back to a level only slightly higher than before the operation was launched (as was seen in Figure 6). This pattern reflects the augmentation of San Diego's personnel strength twice during this period, while El Paso managed its increased level of effort largely within its already-allocated resources.

Apprehension levels at the border declined in November and December from what they had been previously — a clear indication of the deterrent effect of Operation Gatekeeper, but then the surge in January and February appeared to erase the benefits. Another difference may be seen in the personnel level. It increased with the launching of the operation but not as massively as it was increased in El Paso. In addition to the decrease in apprehensions at the border, interior control operations also registered a decrease. However, this does not necessarily signify that fewer illegal aliens were getting into the interior, because the personnel resources dedicated to interior control operations also decreased. Thus, the decline in apprehensions may simply indicate decreased surveillance.

The rate of change over the past four years reflects increased apprehensions from FY-91 to FY-92, but then a process of decline. This decline coincided with the upgrading of the San Diego border's physical security through construction of a new border fence and other measures (see Table 3).

It is noteworthy that even though the apprehension level shot up in January and February, and in the latter month was higher than one year earlier, the overall level for the first five months of the fiscal year still showed a decline from the previous fiscal year. However, the decline was slightly less than the decrease between FY-93 and FY-94, when Operation Gatekeeper was not in effect.

This sector-wide data masks some significant developments that may not be seen without looking at the component sections of the border. Before turning to the San Diego sub-sector data, though, a brief review of the other California sector, El Centro, is appropriate.

EL CENTRO

Data on apprehensions at El Centro, like those at Yuma, Arizona reflect a different pattern from San Diego, which is California's major crossing corridor. In the eastern part of the state, a greater number of apprehensions result from interior control operations, whether highway checkpoints or employment verification, than from operations at the border (with Calexico/Mexicali the major crossing point).

Also, like the Yuma sector which it abuts, the El Centro sector does not appear to have been significantly impacted by the heightened control efforts at El Paso or at San Diego, or even by the surge of illegal entries at the beginning of this year associated with the financial/employment situation in Mexico (see Figure 13).

The number of apprehensions in FY-94 was nine percent lower than in FY-91. Although the number of apprehensions in February was slightly higher than a year earlier, for the first five months of FY-95 (through February), the apprehension level was lower by 10 percent.

The decrease in apprehensions does not appear to have been influenced by the personnel level. There was a reduction of 11 percent between FY-91 and FY-92 and a similar reduction the next year, but the number of agent-days has remained largely constant since then.

SAN DIEGO BORDER CONTROL STATIONS

The San Diego sector is controlled by the Border Patrol at two principal interior traffic checkpoints (Temecula and San Clemente), by five frontier (or line) operation stations (Imperial Beach, Chula Vista, Brown Field, Campo and Boulevard) and by two backup (or area control) stations (El Cajon and San Marcos). Although the border operation stations engage in some interior detention activities, the reverse is not true. The roles of these stations in the overall deterrence effort may be seen in the figures on this page for FY-94, i.e., before the start up of Operation Gatekeeper.

It can be seen that three stations (Imperial Beach, Chula Vista and Brown Field) accounted for 97 percent of all the border apprehensions (see Figure 14). Imperial Beach by far was the most active station, accounting for half of the nearly 375,000 apprehensions.

Three other stations (San Clemente, Temecula and El Cajon) accounted for 95 percent of all interior control operations. This workload fell almost equally between San Clemente and Temecula.

A somewhat similar distribution may be seen in the level of personnel resources in these six stations during FY-94 (see Figure 15). The three principal border control stations accounted for 85 percent of the agent-days. Imperial Beach is shown to account for a significantly larger share of the apprehensions compared to its level of personnel strength.

Data on interior control operations reflect that 77 percent of the total level of personnel resources was accounted for by the three stations that recorded 5 percent of the apprehensions, with San Clemente marshalling only slightly more personnel resources than Temecula.

Data on apprehensions and on agent-days of effort for the first five months of FY-95 — a period that coincides with the inception of Operation Gatekeeper — reveal how the new strategy has affected both of these indicators of Border Patrol activities in the San Diego sector. The share of apprehensions by agents at the Imperial Beach station have fallen from 50 percent to 29 percent (see Figure 16). The largest share of the apprehensions this fiscal year (through February) has been recorded at Brown Field (35% compared to 19% last year). As will be shown later, this is due not only to a decrease in apprehensions in the Imperial Beach area, but also to an increase at Brown Field.

A significant shift may be seen in the level of agent-days of effort at San Clemente, although not in the share of apprehensions (see Figure 17). The change is attributable to the closing of the San Clemente station during part of this period, at the outset of Operation Gatekeeper. This will be discussed later.

The shift after the start-up of Operation Gatekeeper is not as noticeable in the data on the agent-days level of effort by the major border stations (as compared to interior control station operations). The effort at Imperial Beach is only slightly decreased from FY-93 (30% compared to 34%). Brown Field's 16 percentage-point increase in apprehensions was achieved with only a six percentage-point increase in agent-days.

Each of these seven stations has somewhat different border control characteristics. They are discussed separately below, and the changes brought about by the new deterrence effort begun October 1, 1994 are described.

Imperial Beach

The Imperial Beach station takes its name from the fact that it begins at the Pacific shore and extends inland for 5.5 miles to the entry port of San Ysidro. The border control challenges that this terrain presents are formidable. Until the past year, there was no physical barrier across the beach. Because of the waves and the tide, a specially-designed piling system was required.

Inland, rugged foothills begin abruptly and the terrain features include deep canyons. Urban areas of Tijuana on the Mexican side of the border abut the frontier along most of the length of this section. Fencing this border section was a difficult undertaking, but it is now in place. An anomaly of the area is a state wildlife preserve on the U.S. side of the border, separated from the Mexican side only by a chain-link fence that, in the past, has proven easy to scale or cut through. Border Patrol agents explained that permission to extend the new steel landing mat fence across this portion of the border had been denied. They also asserted that the section continues to be used for alien smuggling operations, because successful illegal border crossers may not be pursued in vehicles once they are in the park area.

Another anomaly of the Imperial Beach zone is current residential construction not far from the U.S. side of the border. This development activity is likely to complicate Border Patrol apprehension efforts if the new fencing and control operations do not prove to be entirely successful in deterring attempted illegal entry.

According to INS Commissioner Meissner, former Border Patrol Sector Chief de la Viña and other officials, Imperial Beach was targeted in Operation Gatekeeper for the major increased deterrence effort. The concept was that if this most frequently used point of illegal entry and most difficult terrain could be effectively controlled, that the operational effect could be extended to the control points further inland.

The apprehension and agent-days of effort data for Imperial Beach are somewhat surprising in that they do not show either a major increase in operations or a dramatic reduction in apprehensions (see Figure 18). Almost all of the station's operational agent-days are devoted to border operations. They show only a modest increase of about 15 percent in October, which returned to previous levels in November and December, and then jumped about 25 percent as the challenge of attempted entry also rose in January and February.

However, after an increase in October, apprehension data reflect lower numbers than the previous year. This pattern is not surprising. If the deployment of the Border Patrol was more effective in October, after the launching of Operation Gatekeeper, it is reasonable to expect apprehensions to rise. It is only after the increased chance of apprehension becomes known among aliens and coyotes (alien smugglers) that deterrence would be expected to be effective in producing fewer attempted entries, and, therefore, lower levels of apprehensions.

A closer look at the actual apprehension data shows that the increase in October 1994 over the previous year was a modest three percent, less than the recent average rate of increase experienced in San Diego (see Table 4). Beginning in November, and in each of the following months in the study, the apprehension rate was more than 40 percent below the rate in the previous year. The greatest drop was recorded in December, with the apprehension data reflecting over a 54 percent decline. This is indicative of the fact that the new Border Patrol profile in Imperial Beach constitutes a significant deterrence to attempted illegal entry. The decline in apprehensions would be very dramatic, if it were not judged by the El Paso experience, where apprehensions fell by about 75 percent.

The luster of success in the Imperial Beach data also is somewhat diminished by recalling that the apprehension level had been declining already before Operation Gatekeeper began. So, some of the decrease may be seen as part of that trend rather than attributable to the new deployment. This contrasts with El Paso, where the effectiveness was counter to a rising trend.

Observations — Touring the Imperial Beach sector with the Border Patrol was instructive. It not only brought home the difficulties of the terrain, but it also allowed observation of the new night detection capability. This particular evening, there were only two illegal border crossers, about a half-mile from the detection equipment, who were being tracked until they reached a point where they could be apprehended. There was no sign of any attempted illegal entry in the "Smugglers Gulch" area that had been notorious for the problem in gaining control that it represented.

At the Imperial Beach station, earlier apprehended illegal aliens were being processed with the Border Patrol's new automated identification and record software capability. This new equipment is an important advance in identification capability and in decreasing the amount of time agents must spend on preparing reports rather than patrolling. The electronic digital fingerprinting and the face imaging allow the Border Patrol, for the first time, to have a reliable means of measuring incidence and patterns of recidivism. This will be increasingly useful, as data bases are linked up among stations and sectors, and eventually nationwide, in evaluating deterrence and in efforts to find weak points in the Border Patrol's effectiveness.

The identification of recidivists also triggers an issue that needs to be looked at closely: At what level of repeated illegal entry does it become appropriate to detain and deport illegal aliens rather than continuing to offer them voluntary departure, as is the current practice? The ability to penalize the illegal enterer has not often been used except in cases of resisting detention. It has been hard to prove recidivism. Prosecutors have given low priority to efforts by the Border Patrol to make illegal entry costly to the alien. With the new identification system it will be much easier to make a case against a recidivist.

It still will be necessary to establish a policy framework for deciding how to use the new data. Will a recidivist be detained on the third illegal crossing in three days or a week? Such an effort has significant implications in terms of the capacity of detention facilities. The deterrent effect for would-be illegal border crossers of knowing that they face detention and deportation may be significant. But, the effectiveness will not occur if space is not available to begin to get the message out by actual experience. There will also be an initial surge in cost associated with increased detention and deportation. But this is a cost that is likely to produce dividends if it results in a significantly lowered level of attempted illegal entry over the long term.

Our conclusion from the Imperial Beach station data is that the decline in apprehensions after launching Operation Gatekeeper indicates successful deterrence, albeit not as great as at El Paso. The terrain clearly was a factor in making more difficult the construction of an adequate fence and in vehicular patrolling, but that should no longer be considered a reason for the Border Patrol not to be able to cope with the vast majority of illegal entry attempts.

Over time the new profile should increase in effectiveness as the assumption is generalized on the southern side of the border that attempted entry at Imperial Beach is a sure way to get detained. Some evidence that this is happening may be seen in the apprehension data for January and February of this year. Even though apprehensions at Imperial Beach shot up by nearly 60 percent over the November-December level, they still were down by 44.5 percent from a year earlier. This contrasts with the rest of the San Diego sector where the January-February apprehension level increased by over 60 percent from a year earlier. It also compares favorably with the comparable experience at El Paso, where the apprehension level at the border was up for those two months compared to the same months the previous year by nearly 24 percent, the average increase for the entire southwest border.

Chula Vista

Moving inland, the next border station, Chula Vista, is patrolled from the sector headquarters at San Ysidro. The length of border here is about one mile stretching from the San Ysidro port of entry inland. Most of the border area is urbanized on both sides of the border. Chula Vista represented the second greatest allocation of personnel after Imperial Beach and accounted for the second greatest number of apprehensions in the San Diego sector in FY-94.

With the launching of Operation Gatekeeper, Chula Vista became the second priority in stemming the illegal entry flow and, thereby, pushing efforts to find weak points eastward. The data on apprehensions and agent-hours of operations show Chula Vista falling to third place, as the numbers at Brown Field rose.

The data for Chula Vista show a significant drop off of apprehensions after the launching of Operation Gatekeeper (see Figure 19). The apprehension level for the first three months of the operation (October-December) reflect a 52 percent decline over the same months a year earlier. Then the cyclical surge in January and February, augmented by the Mexican peso devaluation, occurred. The apprehension level for those two months shot up by 414 percent over the preceding two months. To put this surge into perspective, however, it is necessary to compare the January-February data with the apprehension levels for the same months the previous year. When that is done, the increase drops to 39 percent.

Nevertheless, the fact that the increased pressure on the border may be seen in an increase over the previous year at Chula Vista, but not at Imperial Beach, indicates that, despite an increased level of deterrence at Chula Vista, it still is insufficient to avert a surge in determined effort to gain illegal entry into the United States — as apparently has happened along the Imperial Beach section.

Observations — In direct observation of the Border Patrol operations at Chula Vista, it was possible to see the problem posed by the urban nature of the U.S.-side of the border. Once illegal aliens have gotten across the border, either by scaling the fence (or cutting through it with acetylene torches — as has occurred) or by running through the port of entry automobile lanes (as also occurs), pursuing them becomes an urban cat and mouse contest where there are many opportunities for the alien to out-maneuver mobile units of the Border Patrol.

A further limitation on Border Patrol operations is posed by the interstate highway (I-5) that connects to the San Ysidro border crossing port. When illegal aliens are on the edge of the highway, the Border Patrol is enjoined from attempting to apprehend them. The reason is concern for the safety of the aliens and of passing motorists who might find aliens running across the highway in front of them if apprehension were attempted. During the visit to this sector, three presumed aliens were spotted moving northward along the west side of the highway. The Border Patrol mobil unit was only able to radio information on their location and description. The response from the Chula Vista headquarters station at San Ysidro was that they probably were three of four illegal border crossers who had shortly before eluded efforts of the Border Patrol to apprehend them.

In the San Ysidro station, the new electronic identification systems are also in use. A demonstration was provided of video pictures of the faces of two dissimilar appearing detained aliens — who were identified by the software program as the same person — as evidence of how the system is not foiled by superficial changes such as the presence or absence of facial hair. The demonstration was less than satisfying because it was not backed up by fingerprint matching, and visually, it appeared that the two faces likely were not the same person. The question that arose from that demonstration is why have two systems? Isn't the fingerprint data sufficient? Presumably it is more reliable.

One other observation with regard to the Chula Vista headquarters relates to their detention facilities. They are very neat and clean. The Border Patrol escort noted that the center is regularly visited by advocacy groups to check on the treatment of apprehended aliens. If there is filth of any kind in the detention rooms, complaints are lodged about the inhuman conditions of detention. As a result, the Border Patrol has instituted multiple daily cleanings of the facilities.

It would appear that the Chula Vista sector is going to continue to need the increased personnel level that it added in January and February, and probably even more, if it is going to establish a long-term deterrence that will stand up to periodic surges in attempted illegal entry. Further effort is also needed in coping with illegal entry at a port of entry like Ysidro, where illegal migrants run through the traffic to enter the United States. It is clear that safety is an important consideration, but a policy that provides amnesty, albeit of limited duration, to the illegal border crosser as long as he or she is near auto traffic, cannot be the only solution.

Brown Field

The third segment of the border inland from the Pacific is Brown Field, an eight-mile frontier stretch that begins one mile east of the San Ysidro port of entry. The headquarters is at Otay Mesa. This zone is outside of the urban San Diego/Tijuana area, and is characterized by hilly and mountainous areas, as well as canyons in between. In this area the Border Patrol does not maintain a permanent physical presence, but instead relies on periodic patrolling and electronic surveillance to detect the movement of illegal aliens.

The Border Patrol states that Brown Field was recognized as the probable target of increased illegal entry following the inception of Operation Gatekeeper. In fact that has happened (see Figure 20).

The level of apprehensions did not change significantly after the October 1 start-up date. But the agent-days data show an increase in border patrolling of slightly over 30 percent from the level during the first three months of the previous fiscal year. The capability was further augmented in January, so that the level of patrolling was up 83 percent over the January-February level in 1994.

Nevertheless this increased Border Patrol presence was not sufficient to deter would-be illegal immigrants. While the 11 percent increase in apprehensions in November and December 1994 over November and December 1993 may only reflect the greater level of effort, the data for January and February show a 58 percent increase over one year earlier. This demonstrates that the Border Patrol was well advised to augment the apprehension capability along this section of the border, but also that it is still considered vulnerable by would-be illegal immigrants and by coyotes.

Observations — Travelling along this section of the border, one finds an entirely different terrain than the border segments to the west. Although there are vantage points on the mesas from which vast areas of the border may be observed, and there is little protection in the way of underbrush or rocks, there are also numerous areas that are easy to hide in. Electronic surveillance is very useful for the purpose of covering less accessible points of access to the U.S. side of the border. This area is largely left outside of the Operation Gatekeeper effort.

According to the Border Patrol strategic plan, the enhanced surveillance and detention capability of the operation will be extended eastward to reach El Centro and beyond until it meets up with the Arizona and Texas sectors. It is clear, however, that cost\benefit questions will have to be answered as deterrence — rather than detention — becomes the objective in areas that have broad open spaces. Will it be worth the effort to construct new fencing and roads and observation points, as well as the personnel strength to be able to react to breaches in the fence? It is in this type of terrain where it is less likely that the U.S. will adopt a high profile physical presence along the border as a deterrent. Instead, the deterrent will have to be the understanding among would-be illegal immigrants that they are not likely to be able to breach the security of the area.

Even if the increased Border Patrol presence early this year led to a high apprehension success rate, as the high number of apprehensions suggests may have happened, this will not necessarily translate immediately into successful deterrence. Especially among coyotes whose livelihood is smuggling aliens, this terrain makes their clients more dependent than ever on the skills of the guide. Until such time that the deterrence effect of likely apprehension (and perhaps detention and interior deportation) reaches the sending villages and towns and barrios in Mexico, so that the stream northward dries up, the coyotes are likely to target areas such as Brown Field as the best choice between the traditional crossing points at or near large urban areas, yet not so far away that it limits their mobility.

Campo and Boulevard

The remaining Border Patrol operations in the San Diego sector between Brown Field and El Centro are covered by two small stations located at Campo and Boulevard. Campo is about 60 miles from the coast, and Boulevard is about 20 miles further inland. The area of jurisdiction is desolate countryside far from any urban areas. Some of the questions posed about how to manage the border at Brown Field are even more important at these outlying jurisdictions.

The principal focus of the Border Patrol at these jurisdictions is intercepting drug smugglers, who try to take advantage of the desolation. Yet, they are not entirely immune to the dynamics of illegal alien entry pressures. Looking just at the data for Campo (Boulevard apprehension numbers are much smaller), a jump in apprehensions of illegal aliens began in October — with the start of Operation Gatekeeper — and has continued to soar compared to earlier very low levels (see Figure 21). The increases have been accomplished without any increased personnel capability.

Observations — These outposts are the poor stepchildren of the San Diego sector. They generally have not been included in modernized equipment programs, except for an occasional new vehicle.

If there continues to be a significant diversion of illegal alien crossing to these areas as a result of the success of Operation Gatekeeper, they are going to need increased equipment and staff levels to cope with it. The alternative is to rely on efforts to control the flow of illegal aliens on the highways travelling into the interior of the country or at the work site. It seems clear that this would be a significant weakening in the concept of deterrence at the border.

El Cajon and San Marcos

These two interior control operating areas are designed to cover areas north and northeast of San Diego. Their operations include such activities as employer sanctions enforcement in the city and outlying areas, transportation checks, and criminal alien removal responsibilities. San Marcos was split off from the El Cajon station in 1987 to reduce response time to areas further north. The city of El Cajon is 27 miles north of the border, and San Marcos is 48 miles farther north.

Because much of the workload of these stations is considered a lower priority than border control, they have also served as a back-up resource for border reinforcement. With the advent of Operation Gatekeeper, San Marcos was closed, and its personnel used to reinforce the border.

El Cajon, which previously had most of its apprehension activity associated with interior control operations, experienced a significant change as a result of Operation Gatekeeper (see Figure 22). Interior operations, which constituted about 27 percent of the stations operating hours during FY-94, have dwindled since the start of the operation to less than half of that amount. In January and February, when the border was hit by a surge in attempted illegal entry, El Cajon station's interior control operations fell on average to 16 percent of the level of effort one year earlier.

Observations — This pattern of considering interior control operations a secondary priority to be conducted when, and if, border control responsibilities permit, is a form of triage. It is not that checking employers for hiring illegal aliens is any less important, but that the task is not as urgent. Yet, if interior control operations in the San Diego sector, as well as elsewhere in destination areas of the intending illegal immigrant, are able to successfully enforce employer sanctions, this should enhance the deterrent effect at the border and decrease the pressure on the agents assigned there.

Temecula and San Clemente

These two traffic check stations sit astride the major inland routes leading northward from San Diego. They are not in continuous operation, but rather they are opened and closed intermittently. They have accounted for large numbers of illegal alien apprehensions and served as a major control on drug smuggling into the United States.

Temecula is located on highway I-15, and control operations are centered in a mountain pass south of the city, where the Border Patrol intermittently channels all vehicles through a visual screening process by agents. San Clemente operates in a similar fashion on highway I-5, along the coast headed into Los Angeles. In 1994 San Clemente was assigned 128 agents and Temecula 95 agents.

Temecula registered a significant decline in apprehensions with the launching of Operation Gatekeeper (see Figure 23). Did this decline, with a higher level of agent-days, represent an indication that the operation was successful in deterring illegal immigration? That would be a possible conclusion if it were looked at without noting that at the same period of time the level of apprehensions at San Clemente had fallen to zero (see Figure 24).

The San Clemente station had been closed. Information on the closing was readily available. It is amazing that the Temecula station would record any apprehensions at all. If illegal aliens and/or coyotes knew that they could proceed northward up I-5, why then would they use the I-15 route where the chance of apprehension still existed?

In November the "experiment" in closing San Clemente was ended and apprehensions resumed, and increased slightly at Temecula. However, the apprehension data must be somewhat suspect because of the intermittent nature of the operations. A question similar to the one posed above is why would a coyote risk detection by attempting to pass one of these traffic check stations, if it were possible to ascertain with little difficulty whether the checkpoint is functioning?

Observations — It is clear that the traffic control points do operate as a form of interior check on illegal entry. They have recorded significant levels of alien and narcotic apprehensions. Yet, in an increasingly technologically- sophisticated world, where portable phones and radios are commonplace, it is questionable whether spot-check operations can successfully cope with alien smugglers and others who wish to avoid the checking operations and can do so by transiting the check points when they are inactive.

It appears to make no sense to operate only one of these two checkpoints, as the Border Patrol did at the beginning of Operation Gatekeeper. There are three viable alternatives. One would be to close both of these checkpoints definitively. This is a position urged on the INS by legitimate users of these highways, who resent the delays they cause when they are functioning. The checkpoints operate by profiling likely illegal aliens and smugglers. As in police work, this type of activity tends to impact also on legal immigrants and ethnic minorities. Although the Border Patrol agents engaged in this work at Temecula did not say so, they did not appear to be at all enthusiastic about their mission.

The second alternative would be to have the traffic checks operating continuously. This would require an increased personnel commitment, but how much is not clear. Thus, it is not possible to estimate the cost/benefit trade-off from such a change. It is clear that there would be significant public and private sector (and, therefore, perhaps Congressional) pressure against this option. One Department of Justice official in San Diego cast the choices as being either closure or continuous operations.

The third approach is to continue to operate the checkpoints as they have been functioning. However, there may be a modification of this operation that would enhance their deterrent effect. Insufficient observation and exploratory conversations were held with the Temecula agents to know exactly what percentage of the day is covered by the current off-and-on checking operation. It would seem, however, that if intervals of uncontrolled traffic included ones of short duration, and the pattern were random, this would negate the assurance to coyotes provided by advance surveillance of the control point. If, in the time that it would take to get from a point south of the station to it, the station could well become activated, the difference between continual and intermittent checks might be lessened. There would still be a requirement for increased staffing if the intermittent operation were truly random, but it would have the advantage over continuous operation of allowing lines of backlogged vehicles to be eliminated. This might be more acceptable from a public relations perspective.

LESSONS LEARNED

Has Operation Hold the Line at El Paso shown staying power?

Yes, it has. The deterrent effect of the strategy of 24-hour presence on the border in the most frequently crossed area has continued despite some slight lessening of the commitment of personnel to this effort. Nevertheless, El Paso is not invulnerable to renewed pressure from would-be illegal immigrants. A large jump in apprehensions in January and February this year demonstrated that the aura of impenetrability that constitutes deterrence was not sufficient to head off an influx that appears to be related to the Mexican peso devaluation crisis. Efforts to end-run the natural barrier of the Rio Grande and the fencing in central El Paso also demonstrate a need for additional physical barrier construction on the periphery of the city. As deterrence increases elsewhere, it will be important to not assume that El Paso is invulnerable and, thereby, allow it to become a weak link again.

What effect has the El Paso operation had on other Texas jurisdictions and on attempted illegal entry in New Mexico and Arizona?

The results are mixed. The New Mexico section of the El Paso sector has shown little increase of apprehensions, other than the usual seasonal fluctuation, since October 1993, when Operation Hold the Line began. But that changed at the beginning of this year, when greater pressure occurred all along the border. Although more illegal migrants may have entered at that time through New Mexico because of the El Paso operation, this cannot be demonstrated from apprehension data. In fact New Mexico apprehensions rose by less than those in the Texas portion of the jurisdiction.

Texas jurisdictions other than El Paso actually experienced a decline in the rate of increasing apprehensions (5% rather than an earlier 10% rate), but they also were hit by a major influx in January and February, when apprehensions were 27 percent higher than one year earlier. An isolated jurisdiction, like Marfa, shows little reaction to either Operation Hold the Line or to the start-of-year surge.

The Tucson sector, on the other hand, saw apprehensions increase by over 50 percent after Hold the Line began (compared to a 30% increase the previous year), and the first five months of the current fiscal year show apprehensions up by 77 percent. Yuma, by contrast, has witnessed declining apprehensions each year, including the current one. It appears that the Nogales border area has become the route of choice for intending illegal immigrants deterred by a less inviting environment in El Paso.

Is Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego demonstrating a successful strategy of deterrence?

It is showing potential. The INS insists that Operation Gatekeeper is showing successful deterrence. But this conclusion is sustained only when looking at the results in the Imperial Beach section — formerly the primary target of opportunity of the sector. There, apprehensions are down by over 40 percent, and, more significantly, the improved control appeared to be impervious to the surge in attempted crossings at the start of the year. However, the overall apprehension data for the sector reflect a more modest decline of 14 percent for the five months after the start-up of the operation. That is less significant than it seems when it is recalled that the apprehension rate also declined by 14 percent for the full fiscal year before Gatekeeper was launched. Thus, overall, Gatekeeper appears to represent continuation of improved control of the San Diego sector, rather than a dramatic new initiative.

Nevertheless, if the strategy of pushing illegal crossings eastward can be solidified in Chula Vista and extended to Brown Field, there is a real prospect for seriously reducing the illegal entry flow through the San Diego sector.

What is the difference between the El Paso and San Diego operations, and what explains the difference in deterrence?

Part of the difference is in the population of illegal crossers. To the extent that the Border Patrol at El Paso was dealing primarily with crossers whose departure point was Ciudad Juárez, and whose destination was El Paso, while the Border Patrol at San Diego is dealing primarily with long-distance illegal crossers, the latter population may be expected to be more determined in their efforts. Another aspect of that difference is that it will necessarily take longer for a heightened apprehension capability to have the same deterrent effect at the source when the source is in the interior of Mexico or in Central America rather than the other side of the border.

The deployment of agents is also different. The Border Patrol's San Diego deployment of agents in a layered strategy has been attacked as more of the same policy of apprehension rather than deterrence. It contrasts with the Border Patrol agents at El Paso constituting a visible deterrence. Although there are differences in deployment, the deterrent effect of both ultimately depends on the risk of apprehension as viewed by the would-be illegal immigrant. If they both can apprehend the vast majority of illegal border crossers, they should have the same deterrent effect, with the exception that a would-be crosser from Juárez or Tijuana is more likely to give up and go home than one who has a thousand-mile trip home.

The deterrence of the physical barrier at San Diego could be further improved, as indicated in the Sandia Laboratory study cited by the General Accounting Office in testimony before the Immigration and Claims Subcommittee of the House of Representatives on March 10, 1995. One issue that should be considered is the fact that the greater de terrence at El Paso has been achieved with a chain-link fence, i.e. one through which the Border Patrol agents may be seen by intending illegal crossers, whereas the San Diego and Nogales fence construction is steel sheeting. The latter offers security for the Border Patrol from rock throwing or even shooting from the Mexican side, but it also impairs visibility for both the Border Patrol and the would-be crossers. The Border Patrol recognized that the steel fence at San Diego was installed the wrong way, and it is not making the same mistake at Nogales. The wrong way is with the corrugation ripples horizontal — so that they can be readily scaled — rather than vertical. The Border Patrol insists that the horizontal installation was an economy move because the length-wise installation would go farther.

Will greater deterrence lead to a decrease in the number of new illegal immigrants settling in the United States each year?

This is the $64,000 question. At best, the answer would be a qualified yes. The qualifications are needed because the nature of the pressures on the border are variable and because the U.S-Mexican border is not the only way that illegal immigrants enter the United States. If the INS is correct in its estimate that half of the annual net increase of 300,000 illegal immigrants are entering legally and overstaying their visas, then the challenge at the border is to reduce the net increment of 150,000 who are EWI immigrants. Some progress in this direction was probably achieved in FY-94 akin to the overall decline in apprehensions that was also registered during this period (about 19%). It is difficult to do more than guess, though, because the data show only apprehensions, not those who succeed in avoiding apprehension or those who are deterred by greater border security. Any inferences are also made risky by the shifting pattern which shows up in increased pressure on Arizona and eastern San Diego sections of the border. If the apprehension capacity of these sectors was saturated by the rerouted illegal crossers, then the apprehension rate, as a percentage of EWI crossers, would have gone down and the number of successful crossers would have increased at those points. This probably happened in Arizona, where the personnel level of effort increased by about seven percent while the apprehension rate soared by 77 percent.

But, the new pressure on the border this year as a result of the peso crisis has probably negated whatever gains may have been achieved in 1994. At the same time, it is also probably true that if the border security upgrading had not begun, the 1995 surge would leave a much greater mark on the United States than it likely has done so far.

Most importantly, the results of Operation Hold the Line and the encouraging partial results of Operation Gatekeeper indicate that real progress can be made in controlling the U.S.-Mexican border, as the remaining weak spots are reinforced. This paper is not intended to deal with whether the U.S. economy needs low-wage agricultural, domestic or sweatshop labor supplied by illegal immigrants (we think not) or the international implications of shutting off the safety valve of emigration for large numbers of unemployed Mexicans or Central Americans. We would note only that there are countervailing U.S. national interests that offset these concerns.

Was the border control mess inherited by the Clinton Administration the result of inattention by previous administrations?

Yes, but the Congress, controlled up to this year by the Democrats, shares the responsibility. Funding and authorized personnel levels have not kept pace with the challenge. The administration should have pressed for greater resources, but the Congress could also have acted, as it did last year when the Clinton Administration did not ask for as many new Border Patrol agents as appeared to be required.

A major effort to upgrade border security in San Diego was begun during the Bush Administration, although the Clinton Administration expanded it and is extending the corrugated steel fencing to Nogales and, eventually, elsewhere. The major breakthrough in border control was the demonstration of effective deterrence at El Paso. The Justice Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were only reluctantly involved with, and very slow to embrace, the positive results of that now-heralded operation.

What remains to be done?

Still needed are increased physical barriers, increased personnel and a more coordinated approach to overall border management. Funding and authorized personnel levels have increased in the past two years and the current budget request is seeking still more resources. It seems clear that Congress, although it has its own priorities, also recognizes the need for additional reinforcement of the border. But this alone will address only the symptom rather than the underlying problem. The problem lies in the disparity of opportunity between the United States and the sending countries, whether Mexico or Cuba or China. It lies also in the laxity of our defense of our borders and our workplaces against illegal immigrants. Although we have limited ability to improve economic conditions abroad, beyond what we are doing already, we can do much more to reduce the attractiveness of illegal immigration by demonstrating that those who do penetrate our border security will be identified, denied jobs and sent home.

causes a decline in apprehensions at interior immigration checkpoints. Similarly, if there were successful deterrence against aliens finding employment, there should be significant spill-over effects in reducing the pull factors and further ease some of the pressure on the Border Patrol.

If illegal employment is curtailed and a need for foreign workers can be demonstrated that cannot be met by Americans or legal resident aliens in the short term at attractive wages, then mechanisms exist to import those foreign workers, either permanently or temporarily. If it should prove to be correct that the economy needs unskilled foreign workers — after allowing time for market forces to resolve the shortage — the legal immigration channel should siphon off some who otherwise would attempt to enter illegally. The end result is that each of these aspects of immigration — both legal and illegal — are interrelated. Better border management is a challenge of determining where best to allocate resources in order to have the greatest success.

Finally, the Border Patrol has shown at El Paso that more effective deterrence at the border causes a decline in apprehensions at interior immigration checkpoints. Similarly, if there were successful deterrence against aliens finding employment, there should be significant spill-over effects in reducing the pull factors and further ease some of the pressure on the Border Patrol.

If illegal employment is curtailed and a need for foreign workers can be demonstrated that cannot be met by Americans or legal resident aliens in the short term at attractive wages, then mechanisms exist to import those foreign workers, either permanently or temporarily. If it should prove to be correct that the economy needs unskilled foreign workers — after allowing time for market forces to resolve the shortage — the legal immigration channel should siphon off some who otherwise would attempt to enter illegally. The end result is that each of these aspects of immigration — both legal and illegal — are interrelated. Better border management is a challenge of determining where best to allocate resources in order to have the greatest success.

NEW CHALLENGES

Too much of the discussion of border control is focussed on coping with the pressure of illegal immigration. The major challenge of controlling the flow of narcotics and other controlled substances is often forgotten. It is important to recognize that the two are related. The more out of control the border is in terms of illegal aliens, the easier it is for drug smugglers and other contrabandistas to penetrate border security. For example, the narcotic seizure rate at El Paso in FY-94 was up by 16 percent over the previous year before Hold the Line was in effect. This may be due to channelling more of the trafficking into areas easier to control.

Too much of the focus is on apprehensions, and the analysis becomes complicated by the fact that both increasing, as well as decreasing, numbers may represent success. In fact, a more reliable measure is available if the interior control points leading out of the major border crossing areas are operating effectively. Yet, the Clinton Administration's closing of the San Clemente traffic check station can only be understood as a possible precursor to closing it permanently. If that happened it would be absurd to leave open the Temecula station. If both are closed, however, the Border Patrol will have lost the primary means of evaluating the success of its border management. It is clear that the traffic check operations could be more effective, but that too, like improved border security, will be labor intensive.

The attention given to stopping the EWI illegal aliens has tended to distract attention from the fact that is only one part of the problem. Preventing alien smuggling, like preventing drug smuggling, is a recognized international responsibility. Effective measures will always be difficult as long as the United States approaches them unilaterally. Unfortunately, Mexico is not a member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is grappling with the alien smuggling issue. In an October 1994 seminar on migrant trafficking, IOM Director General James Purcell noted that, "Trafficking in migrants is a major issue facing not only governments but societies at large in the coming years. This Seminar is a first step towards taking regional and international action to deal with a problem that confronts all countries."

The administration's recent bilateral negotiations with Mexico, with the peso devaluation crisis as a backdrop, have shown that it understands the need for greater bilateral cooperation to reduce immigrant smuggling. But the problem will be to get the Mexican government to overcome its view that illegal immigration to the United States is in Mexico's best interest.

In addition, the administration, the Commission on Immigration Reform, headed by Barbara Jordan, and many members of Congress have indicated their understanding that border control does not stop at the border. If illegal aliens are home free, or virtually so, once they have eluded the Border Patrol, then intending illegal immigrants will always be more determined, and the work at the border will always be more difficult. The corrective action that must be done is to deny jobs to illegal immigrants. The employer sanctions initiative begun in 1986 by IRCA must be made to work effectively. In addition, those illegal aliens who are identified at job sites or elsewhere must be fairly, but swiftly, removed from the country.

All of these measures require increased resources, as well as coordinated allocation of the resources already available. The administration's FY-96 budget request reflects a commitment to continue to strengthen control at the border. It remains to be seen whether it is prepared to make any commitment — other than a token nod toward experimenting with employment verification proposals — toward making the employer sanctions law effective. And it appeared that the administration was unprepared to increase deportations other than for criminal aliens.

That may be changing, however, given President Clinton's remarks in a radio address on May 6, 1995. He noted that it is nonsensical for law enforcement agencies not to identify illegal aliens to the INS — even though they may not be prosecuted for a crime — and for the INS not to act to secure their departure from the United States. He expressed concern also about the lack of follow-up to make sure that those who opt for voluntary departure actually leave the country.

Therefore, although there are some hopeful signs, it seems clear that a comprehensive package of measures to improve border management will require additional initiatives from the Congress to fill in the missing pieces.

CONCLUSIONS

Recent events make clear that the American public is calling on its representatives to deal effectively with the growing problem of illegal immigration. To deliver the most effective response requires that reform efforts not be piecemeal, as has characterized earlier efforts that have left, or created, loopholes.

The problem of illegal immigration begins in the sending countries, and effective control efforts must attempt to discourage this migration before it begins. Recent efforts to involve the Mexican government in aggressively dealing with alien smugglers must be continued.

The success of border control through deterrence demonstrated in El Paso needs to continue to be spread along the border. Although the Gatekeeper operation in San Diego shows the possibility of a significant reduction in illegal entry sector-wide, that remains to be proven. If the early results at Imperial Beach cannot be maintained while greater deterrence is established at the other San Diego stations, then the Border Patrol should revise its strategy and put the agents on the border, as was done in El Paso. At the same time, increased pressure on our deterrent capability will develop — at least until the appearance of a relatively impenetrable border for illegal entry discourages would-be illegal immigrants from trying their luck at avoiding apprehension — and the Border Patrol's strength must be up to the task of so effectively apprehending illegal border crossers that it will stifle the migration before it starts.

The greatest support that the Border Patrol could receive would be effective action to reduce the attraction of our economy to the poor or simply ambitious from other countries. This can only be achieved when it is clear that employment will be denied to illegal immigrants. National interests require a climate in the country that is inhospitable to illegal entrants, not because of hostility to them, but because the needs of Americans and legal residents for jobs and services must come first. When the border is no longer out of control and job opportunities for the illegal immigrant dry up and those who still manage to get in illegally are sent back home, then annual apprehensions of over one million along the U.S.-Mexican border should become a sign of the past carelessness of the United States in managing that border.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Control: Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive Results, GAO/GGD-95-30, Washington, DC, December 1994.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Border Patrol, "Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond," Washington, DC, July 1994.

Martin, John L. "Operation Blockade: A Bullying Tactic or a Border Control Model?" Backgrounder, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC, December 1993.

Bean, Frank D. et al, Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States-Mexico Border: The Effects of Operation Hold-the- Line on El Paso/Juárez, Population Research Center, Univ. of Texas-Austin, July 1994.