|
Not So Realistic
Why Some Would-Be
Immigration Reformers
Don't Have the Answer
By Mark Krikorian
National Review
September 12, 2005
The Senate is again considering various proposals to address our
massive illegal-alien problem, and the competing bills have one thing in common:
They claim to offer "realistic" solutions to the supposedly unrealistic desire
to enforce the law. Writer Tamar Jacoby, perhaps the most energetic salesman of
the McCain-Kennedy amnesty bill, used some form of "realistic" ten times in her
testimony at a July Senate hearing. Senators Kennedy, Cornyn, Brownback, and
Feingold all touted the realism of their preferred solutions at the same
hearing, and the New York Times and Washington Post have done the same in
numerous editorials.
The problem, of course, is that no one has checked whether our very real
immigration bureaucracy is capable of implementing any of these proposals. And
this is no trivial concern: The success of any proposal depends on registering
and screening millions and millions of illegal aliens within a short period of
time -- a daunting task.
It is therefore necessary to look first at the administrative mandates of the
two most popular immigration bills. The McCain-Kennedy bill would offer amnesty
to the approximately 11 million illegal aliens in the United States, by
re-labeling them "temporary" workers, and after six years, it would grant them
permanent residence. The Department of Homeland Security would have to determine
that the person was, in fact, an illegal alien on the date of the bill's
introduction; that he hadn't left the United States in the meantime; that he was
employed in the United States at the time of the bill's introduction -- "full
time, part time, seasonally, or self-employed"; that he has remained so
employed, which he can prove with records from the government, employers, labor
unions, banks, remittances, or "sworn affidavits from nonrelatives who have
direct knowledge of the alien's work"; that he, if not employed, was a full-time
student; that he has "not ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion"; and that he is
not a security threat, a criminal, a polygamist, or a child abductor. This
required background check is to be conducted "as expeditiously as possible" --
for potentially 11 million people.
Now consider the better of the two major bills before the Senate, the Cornyn-Kyl
bill, which has stronger enforcement provisions and isn't quite an amnesty. (It
instead requires illegals to return home and sign up for its version of a
"temporary" worker program from abroad, and there is no permanent-residence
offer.)
A central component of the bill is "Deferred Mandatory Departure," which would
give illegals who register with the government five years to get their affairs
in order and leave, something you might call an "exit amnesty." The bill
instructs the immigration service to determine many of the same things that
McCain-Kennedy requires, including "the alien's physical and mental health,
criminal history and gang membership, immigration history, involvement with
groups or individuals that have engaged in terrorism, genocide, persecution, or
who seek the overthrow of the United States government, voter registration
history, claims to United States citizenship, and tax history." And the Cornyn-Kyl bill has even more specific deadlines: All applications are to be
processed within one year of its enactment, and at that time the Department of
Homeland Security also must have ready a new document for applicants that would
be machine-readable, tamper-resistant, and have a biometric-identification
component.
The point is not that these requirements are inappropriate; if you're going to
be registering illegal aliens, you'd certainly want to know about their health
status and involvement with terrorism. But the most pressing question remains:
Is it achievable? What would happen, in the real world, if one of these "realistic" solutions were to become law?
Two words: "fraud" and "paralysis."
Will We Ever Learn?
We've attempted much smaller programs like this in the past, and the story has
been the same each time: The lack of administrative capacity, combined with
intense political pressure, causes the immigration service to drop everything
else to meet impossible deadlines -- and ineligible applicants get through
anyway.
The closest parallel is the administration of the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act by the old Immigration and Naturalization Service. Some 3 million
illegal aliens (out of 5 million total) applied for amnesty, and 90 percent were
approved. Fraud was omnipresent, especially in the farm-worker portion, where
applicants presented fake proof of employment -- sometimes as flimsy as a
handwritten note on a scrap of paper -- and gave ludicrous stories, like, "I've
picked watermelons from trees," or "harvested purple cotton."
A report from the inspector general's office of the Department of Justice noted
years later that "given the crush of applications under the program and the
relative fewer investigative resources, INS approved applications absent
explicit proof that they were in fact fraudulent." Two of the fraudulent
applications that were approved were from Egyptian brothers in New York: Mahmud
and Mohammed Abouhalima, who went on to participate in the first World Trade
Center bombing.
We've seen paralysis before, too. On several occasions during the past decade
Congress briefly opened a window for illegal aliens to apply for green cards
without first returning home (by getting married to a citizen or legal resident,
for instance, or by being sponsored by an employer). Hundreds of thousands
applied under the program, and INS had to scramble to redirect resources. As a
result, the backlog of unresolved cases ballooned to around 6 million in 2003,
and wait times at some immigration offices were two years or more -- even for
relatively straightforward matters.
Unrealistic mandates like these are largely to blame for the backlog of
immigration applications, which is now "only" 4.5 million. Since it can't work
through these anytime soon, the immigration service often issues work permits
and travel documents to many green-card applicants right when they submit their
forms, knowing that it will be years before anyone actually reads the
application. This is the present situation at the agency that is supposed to
carry out extensive, complicated new responsibilities under the proposed
immigration bills.
So, if an immigration package anything like McCain-Kennedy or Cornyn-Kyl were to
pass, the following would almost assuredly occur: Immigration offices would be
deluged by millions of applications that would need to be approved under a tight
deadline; harried DHS employees would be forced to put aside their other duties
to meet the onslaught; candidates for citizenship -- foreign spouses of
Americans, refugees, skilled workers sponsored by employers -- would effectively
be pushed to the back of the line; political pressure would force DHS to cut
corners in adjudicating the applications; and huge numbers of ineligible
applicants would be approved (in addition to the huge numbers of eligible
applicants).
The workload created by any such program would be larger than the annual number
of visas currently issued worldwide by the State Department (approximately 5
million), and many times larger than the annual number of green cards issued by
DHS (around 1 million). Delays, mistakes, and fraud may not be what the
supporters of the immigration bills have in mind, but they are nonetheless the
guaranteed outcome. None of this is to pin blame on the bureaucrats charged with
implementing congressional mandates. Rather, the proposals themselves are the
problem, measures animated by an almost utopian spirit, one that seeks to solve
an enormous and long-brewing problem with one swift masterstroke.
Things don't work that way in the real world. Instead, the illegal population
needs to be decreased via muscular, across-the-board immigration enforcement
over a long term. Rather than wait for a magic solution, we can implement an
attrition strategy right now, using available resources. We could, for instance,
immediately reject fake Social Security numbers submitted by employers on behalf
of new employees (the government currently looks the other way). Or the Treasury
Department could instruct banks that the Mexican government's illegal-alien ID
card is no longer a valid form of identification. Or a small portion of
enforcement resources could be devoted to random raids at day-labor gathering
spots. This has an added advantage: As more resources become available -- be they
monetary or technological -- they could easily bolster the attrition approach, as
opposed to current proposals, which from the get-go require vast and untested
programs.
An attrition strategy would adopt the conservative goal of shrinking the
illegal-alien population over time by making it unappealing to be an illegal
alien in the first place. As a result, fewer people would come here illegally,
and those already here would be more inclined to deport themselves. Over the
space of several years, what is now a crisis could be reduced to a manageable
nuisance.
Now that's realistic.
Mark Krikorian is Executive Director of the
Center for Immigration Studies.
|