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Immigration Policy and Low Wage Workers: The Influence of American Unionism
Testimony prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
October 30, 2003
Statement of Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Board Member, Center for Immigration Studies
download pdf. format
Immigration policy is a form of human resource development
which is the sole responsibility of the federal government. As such, it has
economic consequences on the nation’s labor market. Depending on it s provisions
and its enforcement, immigration policy can influence both the quantitative size
and the qualitative skill level of the labor force. As immigrants have never
been equally distributed across the country, there are differential scale
effects on local and regional labor markets. The manifestations of these effects
are employment and wage outcomes. Depending on the historical setting when
specific policies are implemented the outcomes may vary but they will always be
there.
What has happened?
Within a year after the U.S. Supreme Court established that the federal
government has the sole responsibility for the formation and enforcement of the
nation’s immigration policies (in 1892), “the labor movement was among the first
organizations” to urge that limits be set and subsequent policy enactments be
accountable for their economic consequences.1
It was in this context that Samuel Gompers – the President of The American
Federation of Labor and an immigrant himself- said “we immediately realized that
immigration is, in its fundamental aspects, a labor problem.”2
All immigrants have to work or be supported by those who do. In most instances,
so do their spouses and children eventually.
Indeed, every significant piece of immigration legislation enacted by Congress
from the time that it initiated efforts to influence immigration flows in 1864
until the late 1980s bares the stamp of organized labor in its support for
passage or was caused to be repealed as the result of labor opposition.3
Moreover, the ebbs and flows of membership in American unions since 1860 have
over time generally been the inverse of immigration trends. When immigration
levels decline union membership rises; when immigration levels rise, union
membership falls (see Figure 1 at the end of this statement).
During the 1980s, the AFL-CIO strongly supported the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). At its 1985 convention, resolutions were passed
that supported the adoption of sanctions against employers who hire illegal
immigrants; favored the creation of “an eligibility verification system that is
secure and non- forgeable;” created an amnesty program for illegal already in
the United States; and opposed “any new ‘guestworker’ or ‘bracero’ program.”4
After IRCA was passed, the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution in 1987 that called the
new legislation “the most important and far reaching immigration legislation in
30 years” and, it noted that in particular “the AFL-CIO applauds the inclusion
in that law of employer sanctions and of a far-reaching legalization [i.e.,
amnesty] program.”5
But in the late 1980s the leadership of the AFL-CIO began to waffle on its
historic policy position of protecting the interests of American workers from
the adverse economic effects of mass immigration. The AFL-CIO did not take a
prominent role in the political posturing preceding the ultimate passage of the
Immigration Act of 1990. It did not clearly articulate what it favored; it did
not specify what it was against.6
At its 1989 Convention, a resolution was adopted that stated that it “opposes
any reduction in the number of family-based visas or any erosion in the
definition of the family.” Furthermore, it opposed increasing the number of
employment-based immigrants because they represented “a brain drain” of other
nations and the AFL-CIO preferred to expand domestic policies “to increase our
investment in education and job training in this country.”
The Immigration Act of 1990 passed. It significantly raised the prevailing legal
immigration levels by about 35 percent -- to 700,000 visas a year from 1991
through 1994 and to 675,000 visas a year thereafter. It did not reduce the
number of family-based visas (in fact, it increased them) nor did it change the
definition of what constitutes a family. The number of employment-based visas
was significantly increased from 54,000 to 140,000 a year. It added a new
“diversity” admission category (originally with 40,000 visas a year but
increasing to 55,000 visas a year in 1995); and it expanded the ease by which
employers could get access to a variety of foreign workers on a temporary basis.
In terms of its prospective long term impact on the U.S. population and labor
force, the Immigration Act of 1990 is the most significant domestic legislation
enacted by Congress since that time. Given its provisions, the U.S. Bureau of
the Census projects that two-thirds of the expected population increase of the
United States to the year 2050 of 131 million people (or about 80 million
people) will be the consequence of the presence of the immigrants themselves and
of their children.7 Speaking
to this point the National Research Council (NRC) has stated that, “immigration,
then, will obviously play the dominant role in the future population growth of
the United States.”8
At its 1993 convention, the AFL-CIO reversed course entirely. The convention
adopted a resolution that praised the role that immigrants have played in
building the nation. Furthermore, it demonized unidentified advocates of
immigration reform for launching “a new hate campaign cynically designed to
exploit public anxiety by making immigrants and refugees the scapegoats for
economic and social problems.”9
It concluded that “immigrants are not the cause of our nation’s problems.”10
The resolution also encouraged affiliated unions “to develop programs to address
the special needs of immigrant members and potential members” and called for
member unions to work with “immigrant advocacy groups and service organizations”
to protect the interests of new immigrants. Clearly, a new immigration attitude
was emerging within the leadership of the AFL-CIO.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR), which was created to
study the efforts of the Immigration Act of 1990, was reporting its interim
findings. Chaired by Barbara Jordan throughout most of its years of its
operation, CIR concluded that “our current immigration system must undergo major
reform” and requires “a significant redefinition of priorities.”11
It recommended a 35 percent reduction of legal admissions back to the pre-1990
levels; the elimination of the extended family preferences for admission; the
elimination of the employment-based provision that permits unskilled workers to
be admitted; a return to the policy of including refugees within the total
number of immigrants that are admitted each year; no new foreign guestworker
programs; and a crack down on illegal immigration.12
Against this backdrop, the AFL-CIO entered the fray in 1995 by opposing all the
proposed changes. Despite extensive research and findings to the contrary, it
adopted a policy resolution was adopted at its convention that year that
asserted that, “the notion that immigrants are the blame for the deteriorating
living standards of America’s low-wage workers must be clearly rejected.”13
Rather than immigration reform, it proposed increasing the minimum wage,
adopting universal health care and enacting labor law reform as the remedies for
the widening income disparity in the nation.
Aware of the findings of CIR by this time, Congress took up the issue of
immigration reform in the in the Spring of 1996. During its debates, the AFL-CIO
allied itself with other antireform groups to oppose most of the proposed
changes. Together, they succeeded in having Congress separate all the legal
reform measures from the pending bill and then killing them, stripping form the
remaining bill the key proposals for verifications of the authenticity of the
social security numbers as a way to reduce illegal immigration; and dropping
efforts to limit refugee admissions. By joining with a coalition of some of the
most anti- union organizations in the country, labor leaders succeeded in
blocking immigration reform design primarily to protect the economic well-being
of low skilled workers. Devoid of any legal immigration reform and containing
watered-down steps to reduce illegal immigration, the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 was passed.
At its October 1999 membership convention held in Los Angeles, the pro-immigrant
element within the AFL-IO made its next move. Gaining support from unions
representing janitors, garment workers, restaurant workers and hotel
housekeepers, they argued that unions needed to overtly embrace immigrants if
the movement is to survive. They buttressed their case by citing incidents
whereby employers used immigration law to intimidate or to dismiss immigrant
workers who were involved in trying to form unions. In particular, these
advocates sought to end the employer sanctions provision created by the IRCA in
1986 (which organized labor had strongly supported) and to enact yet another
general amnesty for those illegal immigrants now in the country. Support for
this effort was far from unanimous.
To avoid a public confrontation, AFL-CIO officials agreed that the motion would
be briefly debated and then referred to a committee for study. It was done. When
the AFL-CIO Executive Committee met in New Orleans in February 2000, it
consummated its break from the past.14
It would now support expanded immigration, lenient enforcement of immigration
laws, and the legislative agenda of immigrants (which include repeal of
sanctions against employers who hire illegal immigrants; generous amnesties for
the six illegal immigrants already in the United States at the time and
liberalizing restrictions on foreign guest workers who seek to work in the
United States). Thus, the one societal body that had for over a century
faithfully and consistently supported reasonable and enforceable immigration
policies to protect the nation’s working people was poised to betray their
trust.
While some union leaders cheered these actions as did some business lobbyists in
the days that followed, The New York Times editorialized that the
AFL-CIO’s proposal should be rejected” as it would “undermine the integrity of
the country’s immigration laws and would depress the wages of the lowest-paid
native born workers.”15
The final step in this saga was taken at the December 2001 convention of AFL-CIO
held in Las Vegas, Nevada. Seemingly oblivious to the horrendous terrorist
events of September 11, 2001, the AFL-CIO at its membership adopted the
aforementioned pro-immigration agenda put forth by its Executive Council.16
It is hard to imagine a worse-time to announce that the labor movement was
abandoning its historic pro-worker stance on immigration in order to become an
advocate for loose immigration enforcement. The fact that both the unemployment
rate and poverty levels were rising sharply at the same time cast even more
doubt on the wisdom of such an action.
Only three months later, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a major finding that
illegal immigrants are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act if they
are dismissed for union-organizing activities.17
As Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist stated in the majority decision, “awarding
back pay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying federal
immigration laws.”18 The
national interest is to keep people who violate immigration laws out of the
labor market; it is not in the national interest to afford legal rights to
people who are not legally entitled to be working in the country in the first
place.
Why the Change in Position?
There are multiple reasons why organized labor has changed its
historic position on immigration. The first explanation is the obvious one.
Namely, with the foreign born population in the United States now exceeding 33
million people (of whom over 20 million are in the civilian labor force), the
AFL-CIO organizing campaigns in a number of large urban areas are encountering
large concentrations of immigrant workers. Many are illegal immigrants. The
leadership believes, therefore, it is pragmatic to adopt a more accommodating
stance.
Secondly, there is the key self-defense issue. Some employers use the threat (or
actual practice) of turning illegal immigrants into federal immigration
authorities if they seek to vote (or do vote) in union certification elections.
U.S. courts have upheld the right of “all employees -- including those who may
be subject to termination in the future…to vote on whether they want to be
represented by a union.”19
Furthermore, the federal government announced in the Spring of 1999 that it was
essentially abandoning enforcement of employer sanctions at the work site in
favor of focusing on human smuggling activities, border management, and criminal
deportations. This means that illegal immigrants have little to fear about
government enforcement raids unless employers report them.20
Thus, if illegal immigrants are at the work site, unions have to organize the
workers that employers hire. If the government is not going to police worksites,
unions must seek to enlist the illegal immigrants as members or abandon their
organizing efforts with the enterprise in question. Should unions give up such
organizing, employers will have an even greater incentive to hire more illegal
immigrants than they already do. Thus, organizing and protecting illegal
immigrants is not viewed as a matter of principle, it is seen as a matter of
necessity.
Finally, there is the political posturing that has now captured the entire
immigration reform movement. The leaders of both major political parties --
sometimes referred to as “elites” -- believe they can gain from pandering to
pro-immigrant forces (i.e., racial, ethnic, and religious groups) who are
seeking to increase their ranks in the belief that it will enhance the political
influence of their particular group. Similarly, there is the ever present
special interests of business lobbyists always looking for cheap labor and
economic libertarians who believe in open borders as a matter of principle. As a
consequence political scientists James Gimple and James Edwards have described
the result: “The will of the people has had little impact on the tone or
direction of the immigration debate in Washington.”21
Countless public opinion polls that have called for reduced immigration levels
and strict enforcement (not accommodation) of existing law against illegal
immigrants are simply ignored. Organized labor, it seems fears it will be left
out if it adheres to its traditional posture of defending the interests of
American workers. In other words, it has made a pragmatic decision “to throw in
the towel” in favor of lax immigration polices rather than to go down fighting
when the outcome of the political bout is already fixed.
The Sorry Fate of Unskilled Workers
Throughout the long academic history of assessing the impact of
immigration on the American labor force, there is one constant theme: the
immigration inflow has traditionally been dominated by low skilled and poorly
educated persons. It remains so today.
The 2000 Census revealed that 58 percent (12.8 million) of the adult foreign
born population have only a high school education or less. At a time when the
nation has been trying to reduce the size of its low skilled labor pool,
immigration policy is flooding that sector of the labor market with a additional
flow of poorly educated immigrant workers. Furthermore, the United States still
has a substantial number of native born adults in the population. In 2000, 47.7%
of the native born adult population only had a high school diploma or less. That
percentage translates into a staggering 72 million people. This is a substantial
pool of adult native born workers who potentially compete with the preponderance
of the adult foreign born population for jobs, income, and social services.
Research on the impact of mass immigration on the economic well-being of workers
has consistently found that organized labor’s earlier support for restrictive
measures was amply justified. In the post Civil- War era when the fledgling
labor movement initially began to press immigration reforms, economists Timothy
Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson have found that urban real wages would have been
14 percent higher in 1890 were it not for the high immigration levels of the
preceding 20 years.22 Their
findings supported the earlier conclusions of Stanley Lebergott that real wages
in the 25 years following the Civil War tended to move inversely with the ebbs
and flows of immigration levels over this timespan.23
Likewise, studies of the more massive immigration that occurred between 1890 and
1914 were even more supportive of the AFL’s strenuous efforts to reduce
immigration levels during this era. Hatton and Williamson found that, in the
absence of the large-scale immigration that occurred after 1890, the urban real
wage would have been 34 percent higher in 1910. Parenthetically, they observed
that “with an impact that big, no wonder the Immigration Commission produced a
massive report in 1911 which supported quotas!”24
Likewise, economists Harry Millis and Royal Montgomery wrote of this era that
organized labor was correct in its assessment of adverse economic impact of
immigration on American workers “as labor markets were flooded, the labor supply
was made more redundant, and wages were undermined.”25
Following the the enactment of the first ceilings on immigration in U.S.
history, the economic gains to workers were found to be immediate. Indeed, labor
historian Joseph Rayback called the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 “the most
significant pieces of “labor” legislation enacted during” the post-World War I
era.”26 Mills and Montgomery
likewise observed “from the international viewpoint the morality of the postwar
immigration policy of the United States may be questioned, but of its economic
effect in raising real earnings there can be little question.”27
Lebergott, who attributed this tripling of real wages for urban workers that
occurred in the 1920s to the substantial immigration reductions that occurred in
this period, observed that “political changes in the supply of labor can be more
effective in determining wages than even explicit attempts to fix wages.”28
What more powerful statement can be made about the significance of the adoption
of reasonable immigration polices to the enhancement of worker welfare in the
united States?
More recently, a special panel created by the National Research Council (NRC)
issued in 1997 a report on the economic effects of the contemporary immigration
experience of the United States.29
The research had been contracted by the Commission on Immigration Reform to
provide the analytical basis for the conduct of its six- year investigation of
the impact of immigration on the people of the nation. The NRC report catalogued
the fact that the educational attainment levels of post-1965 immigrants have
steadily declined. Consequently, foreign-born workers on average, earn less than
native-born workers and the earnings gap has widened over the years. Those from
Latin America (including Mexico) presently account for over half of the entire
foreign-born population of the nation, and they earn the lowest wages. Thus, the
NRC, found no evidence of discriminatory wages being paid to immigrants. Rather,
it found that immigrant workers are paid less than native-born workers because,
in fact, they are less skilled and less educated. The relative declines in both
skills and wages of the foreign-born population was attributed to the fact that
most immigrants are coming from the poorer nations of the world, where the
average wages, educational attainment, and skill levels are far below those in
the United States. As a direct consequence, post-1965 immigrants are
disproportionately increasing the segment of the nation’s labor supply that has
the lowest human capital endowments. In the process, they are suppressing the
wages of all workers in the low skilled sector of the labor market. More
specifically, the study documented the fact that almost half of the decline in
real wages for native-born high school dropouts (i.e., unskilled workers) from
1980-1994 could be attributed to the adverse competitive impact of unskilled
foreign workers. It was for this very reason that Chair Barbara Jordan
summarized CIR’s proposed recommendations on legal immigration reform by
stating:
What the Commission is concerned about are the
unskilled workers in our society. In an age in which unskilled workers have far
two few opportunities opened to them, and in which welfare reform will require
thousands more to find jobs, the Commission sees no justification for the
continued entry of unskilled foreign workers.30
It was in the same macro context that the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to
the President identified post-1965 mass immigration as being one of the
contributing factors to the worsening income disparity that the nation
experienced has since 1968. In 1994 the CEA explained that “immigration has
increased the relative supply of less educated labor and appears to have
contributed to the increasing inequality of income.”31
Since 1965, when policymakers inadvertently awakened the phenomenon of mass
immigration from out of the nation’s distant past, the foreign-born population
of the United States has increased by 282 percent, (from 8.5 million immigrants
to 32.5 million immigrants); the civilian labor force has risen by 100 percent
(from 74.4 million workers, to 148 million workers); but union membership has
fallen by 11.5 percent (from 18.2 million members, to 16.1 million members) over
this interval. Since 1968 (the year the Immigration Act of 1965 took full
effect), the distribution of income within the nation has steadily become more
unequal. The decline in union membership and the impact of mass immigration have
been both identified by the CEA as contributing explanation for the worsening
income inequality in the nation.32
In this environment, mass immigration has once more done what it did in the
past. It has lessened the effectiveness of unions and, accordingly, diminished
their attractiveness to workers. To be sure, there are other factors involved in
the membership decline of organized labor but mass immigration is one of the key
factors.33
The nation’s immigration laws need to be strengthened, not weakened or repealed.
Employer sanctions set the moral tone for immigration policy at the workplace.
The identification loopholes need to be plugged and worksite enforcement given
priority, not neglected. There should not be more mass amnesties for persons who
have brazenly violated the laws that, since 1986, clearly state that illegal
immigrants should not be in the workplace in the first place. Such amnesties
only encourage others to enter illegally and hope for another amnesty. The mass
amnesty of persons who are overwhelmingly unskilled and poorly educated only
adds to the competition for low wage jobs with the citizens and permanent
resident aliens. Moreover, as noted earlier, mass amnesties since the onset of
foreign terrorism endanger national security because they bypass meaningful
background checks that are required of all legal immigrants.
Rather than pursue its past role as a careful monitor of the impact of the
nation’s immigration policies on the economic well-being of working people, the
AFL-CIO has chosen to become an advocate for the pro- immigrant political
agenda. But his strategy comes with a heavy cost. First, it means that success
in the organization of immigrants will not translate into any real ability to
increase significantly the wages or benefits of such organized workers. As long
as the labor market continues to be flooded with low-skilled immigrant job
seekers, unions will not be able to defy the market forces that will suppress
upward wage pressures. Secondly, the focus on the advancement of the interests
of low-skilled immigrant workers can only cause the alienation of low-skilled
native-born workers who must compete for these same jobs because they lack the
human capital to qualify for better ones. How long can it be until these other
workers recognize that their ambitions for higher wages and better living
standards cannot be achieved as long as mass immigration is allowed to flood low
wage labor markets? The fundamental issue for labor has never
been: should unions organize immigrants? Of course they must, as they have
always done. Rather, it is should labor seek to organize workers specifically
because they are immigrants, and in the process, become a proactive advocate for
immigrant causes? Or should unions do as they have in the past: seek only to
organize all workers purely on the grounds of the pursuit of their economic
well-being? If labor seeks to organize immigrants on the same
basis as it does native-born workers (i.e., making no distinction between the
nativity of workers), there is no reason to embrace the broad range of immigrant
policy issues. Indeed, the hard reality of the lessons of labor history is that
the more generous the immigration policy, the worse it is for all workers in
their efforts to raise wages, to improve working conditions, and to secure
employment opportunities. The wisdom of economist Melvin Reder, a pioneer in the
analysis of the labor market impact of immigration, should always be kept in
mind: One immigration policy inevitably reflects a kind of
national selfishness of which the major beneficiaries are the least fortunate
among us. We could not completely abandon the policy, even if we so desired.34
What is bad economics for working people cannot be good politics for unions or
good public policy for the nation.
Endnotes
1 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life
and Labor. (New York: E.P. Dutton Company, 1925), Volume 2, p.154.
2 Ibid., p. 157.
3 For elaboration see Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.,
Immigration and American Unionism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2001.
4 "Immigration Reform,"
AFL-CIO Policy Resolution Adopted October1985 by
the Sixteenth Constitutional Convention,
(Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1986) pp. 45-46.
5 "Immigration Reform," AFL-CIO Policy
Resolution Adopted November 1987, (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1988), p.
47-48.
6 "Immigration Reform," AFL-CIO Policy
Resolution Adopted November 1989, (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1990), p. 46.
7 U.S. Department of Commerce, Current
Population Reports, P25-1130 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1996).
8 National Research Council, The New
Americans, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), p. 95.
9 "Immigration and the Labor Movement,"
Policy Resolutions Adopted October 1993 by the AFL-CIO Convention,
(Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1994), p. 14.
10 Ibid
11 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform,
Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, 1996), see letter of transmittal, p. i.
12 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform,
Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997).
13 "Immigration Reform," Policy
Resolution Adopted October 1995 by the AFL-CIO Convention, (Washington,
D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1996), p. 68.
14 "Immigration," AFL-CIO Executive
Council Actions, (February 16, 2000), pp. 1-4.
15 "Hasty Call for Amnesty," New York
Times, (February 22, 2000), p. A-22.
16 Tom Ramstock, "AFL-CIO Adopts Amnesty
Proposal," Washington Times, (December 5, 2001), p. C6.
17 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National
Labor Relations Board , (2002).
18 Gina Holland, "Politics: Court Decides
Illegal Immigrants Not Entitled to Same Rights as U.S. Worker, Associated
Press Online, (March 27, 2002) p. 1.
19 National Labor Relations Board v.
Kolkka, 9th Cit., No. 97-71132 (March 17, 1999).
20 "Meissner Announces New INS Strategy to
Combat Smuggling on Illegal Workers," Daily Labor Report, (March 31,
1999), No. 61, p. A-9; "Ex-Panel Member Blasts INS Decision to de-Emphasize
Worksite Enforcement," Daily Labor Report, No. 127, p. A-3
21James G. Gimpel and James R. Edwards, "The
Silent Majority," Journal of Commerce, (June 23, 1998), p. 8A.
22 Timothy H. Hatton and Jeffrey G.
Williamson, "The Impact of Immigration on American Labor Markets Prior to the
Quotas," Working Paper No. 5185, (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., 1995), p. 30.
23 Stnaley Lebergott, Manpower in
Economic Growth, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 163.
24 Timothy H. Hatton and Jeffery G.
Williamson, Op. cit. p. 30. [Emphasis is on the original]; See also
Stanley Lebergott, op. cit., p. 162
25 Harry A. Mills and Royal E. Montgomery,
Labor’s Progress and Some Basic Labor Problems, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1938), p.31; see also pp. 239 and 244 for related discussions.
26 Joseph G. Rayback, A History of
American Labor, (New York: Free Press, 19676), p. 278.
27 Mills and Montgomery, op. cit. p.
211.
28 Lebergott, op. cit. p. 164.
29 National Research Council, The New
Americans: Economic, Demographic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, Edited
by James P. Smith and Barry Edemonton (Washington, D. C.: National Academy
Press, 1997).
30 Statement of Professor Barbara Jordan,
Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, (News Release by the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform, Washington, D. C., June 7, 1995).
31 Council of Economic Advisers, Economic
Report of the President, 1994, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1994), p. 120.
32 Council of Economic Advisers, Economic
Report of the President, 1995, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1995), p. 182; and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report…1994,
op. cit., p. 120 See also Daniel H. Weinberg, "A Brief Look at Postwar U.S.
Income Inequality," Current Population Report, P60-191, (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996), p. 1.
33 For elaboration, see Briggs,
Immigration and American Unionism, op. cit., Chapter 6
34 Melvin W. Reder, "The Economic
Consequences of Increased Immigration,"
The Review of Economic and Statistics,
(August, 1963),p.31.
(Figures are unavailable)
Sources for Figure 1 are:
1 Foreign Born Data: 1790-1850: Elizabeth W. Gilbey and Edgar
Hoover, "Population and Immigration," in American Economic History,
Edited by Seymour Harris, (McGraw-Hill, 1961). Table 6; 1860-2002: U.S. Bureau
of the Census (various reports).
2 Union Data: 1870-1890: Lloyd Ulman " The Development of
Trade and Labor Unions," in American History, Edited by Seymour Harris,
(McGraw-Hill, 961), p. 363.; 1890-1980: Leo Troy and Neil Sheflin, U.S. Union
Sourcebook ,
(Industrial Relations and Information Sources, 1985).
1990-2002 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Note: The percentage is of unionized
of wage and salaried employees for this latter data series).
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