|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Necessity of Tackling Both Major Sprawl Factors The oft-heard assumption of many advocates of the Smart Growth movement that population growth is only a minor — or inconsequential — factor in the conversion of rural land to development is shown to be false. Although such a contention is true in several urbanized areas and in a few states, it is not true in the overwhelming majority of cities and states, where population growth is a significant factor or the primary factor in sprawl. And in the country as a whole, roughly 50 percent of all losses of undeveloped land appears to be related to population growth. Expressed more dramatically, the analyses in this study suggest that population growth has about the same impact on sprawl as do all other factors combined. To neglect the population factor in the anti-sprawl fight would be to ignore essentially half the problem. At the same time, one must be careful not to overstate the role of population growth or to over-promise what U.S. population stabilization would bring. Under current conditions, even if all population growth were stopped, farmlands and wildlife habitat around the nation’s cities would continue to suffer large amounts of sprawl. Local, state, and national governments desiring an end to sprawl must work on stopping the factors that increase the developed land per person, as well as factors that increase population. This study disproves the contentions of certain "population hawks" that problems like sprawl could be largely resolved if the country would just stabilize its population. Focusing on only one set of factors appears to guarantee failure in stopping sprawl. Even with a successful single-pronged approach, cities will sprawl just as far; it simply will take them longer to get there. Some earlier studies have failed to discover the necessity of the two-pronged approach because they did not focus on elimination of rural land – the permanent removal of farmland and natural habitat through the process of urban and other development. Instead, they focused on esthetics, efficiency, order, capital and operating costs to local governments, and other urban-planning criteria. While those other aspects of sprawl are legitimate and important, the actual loss of farmland and natural habitat and the never-ending expansion of our cities are among the greatest reasons Americans are clamoring for public policies to combat sprawl. And they are the main reasons why sprawl is so damaging environmentally. Hence, this study focused on quantifying that urban growth spreading out over rural land. Whether the development was attractive or ugly, well-planned or chaotic, densely populated or sparsely populated, did not matter in this study, which objectively stuck to analyzing actual acres of lost rural land. Once public officials focus on actual loss of rural land, they cannot avoid the importance of population growth this study has found. Interestingly, this is not the first study to analyze sprawl’s relationship to population. The findings of this study are in line, for example, with those of President Clinton’s Council on Sustainable Development. It declared in 1996 that environmental sustainability in this country is not possible without U.S. population stabilization. Sprawl is one of the environmentally unsustainable trends of this country. The President’s Council recommended that the country "move toward stabilization of U.S. population," a recommendation that this study found will provide great relief from sprawl. 180Local Influence on Population Growth. Local and state officials who take seriously the findings of this study and the desire of citizens to dramatically curb sprawl have a number of tools to reduce population growth in their jurisdictions. To wield such tools would require officials to go against a Babbitry strain of American polity that runs through our entire history — the desire of nearly every mayor and governor to preside over a larger and larger population that qualifies for more and more state and federal dollars and that enjoys greater visibility and clout on the national scene; the desire of nearly every newspaper publisher to have a never-ending increase in potential subscribers and in consumers for the businesses buying ad space. While various polls have suggested that most Americans would prefer that population growth in their communities stop or dramatically slow down, many public officials claim bragging rights for successfully promoting exactly the opposite outcome. Local officials and the people they represent are in a tug of war over sprawl. This study shows that it is not possible for the public to achieve the victory it desires over sprawl if local officials continue to subsidize and entice local population growth. While most Americans appear to prefer less or no population growth in their locales, there are indications that the prevailing sentiment among local and state officials is to back policies that encourage higher population regardless of what it does to the per capita standard of living and quality of life of the residents they serve. To these officials, population growth is an intrinsic public good that nearly always must be pursued. This can be seen in urbanized areas like Pittsburgh, which benefits from a stabilized population by having no population-induced sprawl and having overall sprawl that is far below the national average. In such cities, many civic leaders clamor for ways to boost the population. They offer subsidies and tax breaks to lure companies to locate there and they advocate population growth inducements even through enticing low-wage foreign workers who require more public subsidy than other kinds of population growth. 181 A growing body of literature has explored the forms of public subsidies for local population growth. A recent study by sprawl expert Eben Fodor for a group called Alternatives to Growth Oregon attempted to quantify the amount of subsidy each year to entice population increase and land development. The Fodor study is particularly interesting because it finds such large subsidies of growth in a state that may very well be the nation’s leader in trying to control growth.182The study found that in the year 2000, Oregon taxpayers were forced to provide $738 million in uncompensated infrastructure subsidies for new growth. This included the costs of additional roads, sewage treatment, fire stations, libraries, schools, etc. A recent survey showed that 73 percent of Portland-area residents believe that new development should pay all of those costs so that the public provides no subsidy. 183 When total public subsidies were calculated, Fodor estimated a $1.14 billion net taxpayer expense for enticing more of the population growth that is driving most of the Oregon sprawl that the public detests.Removing these giant taxpayer subsidies to local growth and forcing the purchasers of newly developed land to pay the true costs of that development would surely decrease the number of newcomers into a town, at least for the short run. It would also have the effect of deflecting the population growth to other towns or areas. National Influence on Population Growth. In other than the very short-term, local and state officials can only be so successful in slowing population growth in their jurisdiction if the national population continues to grow by more than three million people a year. Those 30 million and more new Americans each decade will nearly all settle in some local community, even if every one of the communities stops subsidizing population growth. As was noted above, there are three sources of our national population growth — native fertility (in conjunction with increasing lifespans), immigration, and immigrant fertility. We know this about their contribution to long-term growth: • Native fertility remains well below replacement level and has not been a source of long-term U.S. population growth since 1971. • Immigration and immigrant fertility (births to foreign-born mothers), on the other hand, are far above replacement level and the sole source of long-term population growth in the United States. 185Nearly all long-term population growth in the United States is in the hands of federal policy makers who have quadrupled traditional annual immigration numbers to an average of a million a year since 1990 and allowed illegal migration to rise to more than 700,000 permanent settlers a year. 186As long as the federal government pours that volume of population growth into the nation, most local communities are going to experience sprawl regardless of local disincentives for population growth. Federal Immigration Policies: No. 1 Force in U.S.
Sprawl The policy implication would be that long-term success of local communities in combating sprawl is heavily dependent on whether the federal government decides to stop forcing massive population growth through elevated levels of immigration. It is not possible to create a precise ranking of the two-dozen or more factors that increase per capita land consumption. But each of them can claim only a small fraction of the roughly 50 percent of sprawl that is related to per capita consumption growth. The other 50 percent of sprawl, however, is related to population growth and is divided only two ways — between native fertility and immigration (new immigrants and immigrant fertility). New immigrants and immigrant fertility account for the majority of U.S. population growth. Thus, it would appear that immigration is a far larger factor in sprawl than any other. Although the above logic makes sense statistically, personal knowledge about this era’s immigrants causes many people to doubt that immigration could really be a significant factor in sprawl. A common perception about immigrants is that they are poor and dwell at high-density levels in the nation’s urban cores. How can a people who crowd into the inner cities be held responsible for sprawl on the outskirts? When immigration is publicly blamed for increasing sprawl, it is not uncommon to see letters to the editor appear in local newspapers arguing that it is not densely-clustered, apartment-dwelling immigrants but hyper-consuming American natives who build the big houses in the suburbs, who build the freeways to access them and the strip malls to service them, and who use up all the land. Growth from Immigrant vs. Natives. The hypothesis that often is advanced suggests that although population growth from American natives causes sprawl, population growth from immigration does not. That hypothesis is challenged by the four primary ways that population growth from immigration causes sprawl: (1) Direct settlement by immigrants in the suburbs;
(2) High fertility creates larger second generation of households, and children of immigrants desert urban cores by higher margins; (3) Immigrants facilitate movement of natives to outer edges; (4) Natives flee immigrant concentrations. Direct Settlement by Immigrants in the Suburbs. Perceptions are heavily colored by the behavior of immigrants when they first arrive. Indeed, new immigrants are nearly twice as likely to live a central city as are natives. 188 Nonetheless, Census data reveal that even among new immigrants, the majority (56 percent) live outside the central city of a metropolitan area — where the sprawl occurs. As a 2000 article in Preservation magazine noted: "Suburbs are on their way to becoming the most common place of residence for Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans, the groups that make up most of the country’s foreign-born population."189From the large Mexican community in the Washington, D.C., outer suburb of Manassas, Va., to the Hmong of California’s Central Valley and the Somalis of Fargo, N.D., recent immigrants are settling outside America’s core cities. As two sociologists remark with regard to contemporary immigrants: "For these newcomers, the ‘port-of-entry’ to the American Dream is more likely to be the suburban arches of McDonald’s than the smoke-stacks of a downtown factory." 190 With more than a quarter of all adult immigrants holding a college degree and participating heavily in well-paid professions, it should not be surprising to find them well-represented among the home-builders and home-buyers pushing the urban edge into pastures, fields, woods, and wetland. In the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, for example, 89 percent of immigrants lived outside of the District of Columbia, according to the 1990 Census.191It should not be surprising to find that most immigrants want to live like Americans. The predominant motivation of immigrants in coming to America is to increase their consumption to American levels; they leave family, home, country, and culture to move to the United States in order to consume more food, education, health care, consumer goods, housing, and land. The American Dream is most commonly described in terms of increasing their standard of living — not living packed in apartments so as to protect more open space or riding in a bus to reduce traffic congestion and air pollution instead of owning and driving a car as soon as they can afford it. Immigration may help explain part of the reason why average commuting times across the country are increasing so rapidly, according to a 2003 Christian Science Monitor report. "Immigration is the great wild card," said Alan Pisarski, a travel consultant and author of Commuting in America. "I’m seeing the impact of immigration on almost everything." Robert Lang, director of the Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, indicated that immigration is contributing to increasing traffic congestion because the fast-growing foreign-born population is moving quickly to the suburbs and because "immigrants are moving very quickly from public transportation to cars." Immigrants start behaving like Americans as fast as they can. Whatever high-consumption, environmentally damaging lifestyle the average American may have will be multiplied millions of times a decade by the arrival of millions of immigrants because each of them, on average, will largely emulate American consumption patterns.192 Immigrant families move to the outer edges for the same reason so many native families do — cheaper rents, more square footage and bigger yards for the money, and the perception of more safety for their children. The fact that most immigrants make considerably less money than natives actually increases the pressure on them to live in the outer fringes in many areas such as Atlanta because that is where land, houses, and apartments are cheaper than in most of the rest of a metropolitan area — and also because their jobs are in those outlying areas. The Los Angeles Times reported that growing numbers of immigrants in California are skipping even the outer edges of the metropolitan areas and creating population booms in rural areas in part because of the perception that "compared with gang- and drug-infested inner-city neighborhoods, even end-of-the-road farm hamlets are preferable." 193High Fertility Creates Larger Second Generation of Households. Because immigrants have a fertility rate that is at least 40 percent higher than that of American natives, the children of immigrants are an even more important cause of sprawl than the immigrants themselves. 194 While American natives have a "sub-replacement" fertility rate around 1.9 that creates a slightly smaller size of each succeeding generation, the high average fertility of immigrant families produces larger succeeding generations.195 The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Hispanic foreign-born women (a large majority of new female entrants each year) is around 3.2.196 Thus the second generation is substantially larger than the first generation of immigrants and requires more housing and places to work, shop, and recreate.The children of immigrants have another increased direct impact on sprawl: They grow up with even stronger desires than the original immigrants to live outside the core cities. In many cities, the largest flow in the exodus from core city to suburbs may be the children of immigrants. Only 31 percent of adult children (21 and over) of immigrants live in the nation’s central cities. This falls to 28 percent for those over age 35 and compares to 27 percent for all American natives. For the children of immigrants who have settled down and purchased a home only 24 percent have done so in the nation’s central cities. 197Thus, assimilation to the American land-consumption patterns appears to be complete by the second generation. The children of immigrants shun core-city living in the same proportion as natives. This points to one of the great weaknesses of American core cities: Many of them are places that not only fail to attract as many American natives to live in them as move out, but they cannot attract even half of the mostly third-world immigrants. 198 And, of the immigrants they do entice to live in their neighborhoods, those core cities cannot hold onto a significant part of their children once they become adults. Until American core cities become places where American natives — whether the children of immigrants or of natives — want to live, the land in those cities will be underutilized and urban flight will continue to be a major source of sprawl.Immigrants Facilitate Movement of Natives to Outer Edges. Immigration can facilitate the movement of natives to the suburbs in two ways. First, immigrant home-buyers purchasing homes from natives enable the latter to liquidate their fixed assets in urban cores and reinvest in suburban homes. Except for the most wealthy of natives who build new homes at the edge of urban areas, they would not be able or willing to finance the new construction if there were not buyers for the homes where they previously lived in the core cities and existing suburbs. This concept might appear to be contradicted in the urbanized areas that had significant sprawl despite having no population growth, and even population decline. The Pittsburgh Urbanized Area, for example, lost 9.1 percent of its population between 1970 and 1990 and had little immigration but still sprawled by 30.5 percent. Nevertheless, this rate of sprawl was still far less than for other cities; in fact, cities that experienced population growth sprawled three times faster than did Pittsburgh. 199 But with no population growth in Pittsburgh, who was buying the old homes and moving into the old apartments to enable so many people to build new homes beyond the urban boundaries?The primary answer is found by looking at changing household size. The average household nationwide became 16 percent smaller between 1970 and 1990. Thus, even if the population of an average city remained exactly the same, it would need roughly 16 percent more housing units to accommodate that same size population. It is reasonable to assume that, all other things remaining the same, an urbanized area like Pittsburgh would sprawl around 16 percent just in response to the 16 percent decline in household size and the resulting increase in households per 100,000 population. It would not have to sprawl that much if at least some of the extra households could be provided new housing in undeveloped or underdeveloped parcels in the existing urban area. But the existing patterns of development would have had to change. Without change, the decline in size of households would create sprawl. The causes of the decline of American household size are many. They include increased ratio of home-buying adults to dependent children in the population, an increased divorce rate, fewer children in families, delayed age of marriage, the financial ability and the will for unmarried adults to live apart from their parents and in single households rather than group households, and the increased longevity of senior adults who often are widowed or otherwise single and who rarely have children in the household. Over the long-term, smaller households should be able to live in smaller houses and apartments. It should be possible to have more households per square mile. But over the short-term, the exact opposite often occurs. When a couple divorces, for example, one adult stays in the previous home and the other usually moves into another. In another example, a person may die and the surviving spouse might occupy the same home space. For declining household size not to create sprawl while the population remains the same or is growing, the remaining divorced spouse would need to build another dwelling in the back yard, or the surviving widow(er) would need to sub-divide the apartment. The number of households per square mile of city would have to increase. In reality over the short-term, though, that kind of major in-filling and sub-dividing has not occurred, and the additional households created by declining household size have caused new dwellings to be constructed outside of the existing urban boundary. The second way that high immigration facilitates additional development on the edges of cities while enlarging the size of the new houses and lots is by providing widespread availability of cheap, low-skill labor. This amounts to a transfer of wealth that makes expansive suburban lifestyles more affordable for middle-class natives. This includes everything from construction to landscaping and maintenance. If cheap foreign-born construction and landscaping labor were not available, for example, there would be far fewer people building houses with one-acre to five-acre yards which the owners have no desire to maintain on their own. In fact, the insistence of some affluent suburbanites that they cannot survive without their foreign-born housekeeping, child-rearing, and landscaping labor is one of the pressures on Congress to keep immigration at its high levels. Natives Flee Immigrant Concentrations. From Dade County, Fla., (the Miami area) to the Greater Los Angeles Basin, large waves of immigration have been responsible for the flight of natives to the suburbs — or out of certain regions or states altogether. Neither native-born Americans, nor older immigrants, nor the children of immigrants prefer to live in areas of high immigration. When immigrants first arrive in the United States, they tend to settle disproportionately in the urban cores or older suburbs. Existing residents of those areas — whether white, Hispanic, black, or Asian — often dislike the cultural changes and instability associated with a heavy immigration influx and move away. Analyzing Census Bureau data on internal migration, University of Michigan geographer William Frey has shown that "immigration exerts a pronounced impact on both the magnitude and selectivity of out-migration from high immigration metro areas."200In the 1980s and 1990s, natives began moving en masse out of entire regions like southern California and southern Florida, for other parts of the same states or for other states altogether. California experienced an exodus of working-class whites of nearly 100,000 households. Many retirees pulled up stakes from California and headed for Nevada, Arizona, Washington, and Oregon. Numerous whites, in particular, have moved to more rural regions, like the Rocky Mountain West, bringing change and development pressures in their wake. 201 Other states with high concentrations of new immigrants also saw net losses of their white populations. "Between 1985 and 1990, New York lost more than a half-million whites in its exchanges with other states; Texas and Illinois lost more than a quarter-million; New Jersey lost nearly 200,000 and Massachusetts lost 114,000."202Blacks and other minorities have also been forsaking high-immigration inner cities for the suburbs. 203 They go in pursuit of affordable housing, better schools, less crime, lower living costs, more elbow room, greenery, and open space. "After decades in which America’s cities worried primarily about white flight, cities are now facing the increasingly rapid departure of middle and working class minorities," wrote Karen De Witt in The New York Times.204Perhaps nowhere has "black flight" been more pronounced than in South-Central Los Angeles, where as recently as 20 years ago residents were almost exclusively African American. As Michael A. Fletcher wrote in The Washington Post, "South Central was synonymous with black Los Angeles." 205 An extended quote from Fletcher reveals the anxiety felt by blacks as other groups increasingly displace them:To be sure, the new immigrants have renewed old neighborhoods, created new businesses and enriched the culture of Los Angeles. But the exploding diversity also has changed the nature of racial conflict and drawn new groups into battles that once were waged almost exclusively between blacks and whites. Here, black and Latino civil servants square off over public jobs. Black activists and Asian storeowners fight over control of local businesses. And Latino and Asian gangs battle for control of their turf. In Los Angeles, there are suburban developments, such as Monterey Park, that are almost exclusively Chinese. Nowhere is that more vivid than in the county’s South Central corridor, where the number of Latinos is overwhelming the African American population. Much as blacks demanded a fairer share of the power and resources from whites a generation ago, Latinos are now demanding that blacks and others share jobs, special school programs and political control. And like whites before them, many African Americans feel threatened by those demands. Calling attention to this kind of racial and ethnic discord is not to cast aspersions on any one group. It is not a question of one minority group being in the right and another group being in the wrong. It is simply to acknowledge that rapid cultural and social change can be very uncomfortable or even distressing for anyone, and that tumultuous rates of change in high-immigration American cities since 1980 have led to the massive out-migration of native residents of all backgrounds. Most black Americans from high-immigration zones in Los Angeles who have moved away have gone to places like the San Fernando Valley, and Ventura, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino counties, as well as to desert communities even further away. 206 Others have gone further yet. Recent Census data confirm that there is a historic migration underway of African Americans back to the urban and rural South.207Overall Impact of Immigration on Sprawl • Immigrant growth is less of a cause of sprawl than is native growth because immigrants on average are poorer and consume less. • Immigrant growth is a bit less of a cause of sprawl because immigrants are a bit more likely to settle in core cities than natives. • But immigrants are similar to American natives who move into a core city in that they cause sprawl by facilitating construction on the outskirts by purchasing the homes of those doing the constructing. • Immigrants cause sprawl in a similar way as natives by settling in the suburbs at about the same rate as natives. • Immigrants are much more a cause of sprawl than natives when it comes to fertility; immigrants produce much larger second generations of households which are just as likely to live outside the core city as natives. • Immigrants moving into a core city or older suburb are also more of a cause of sprawl than are natives because the presence of immigrants in large concentrations creates cultural change that drives natives and older immigrants away from their existing neighborhoods. While there are no precise measurements of each of those effects, it should be clear to an objective observer that population growth from immigration produces about the same level of sprawl that one would expect from any kind of population growth.
Center for Immigration Studies Home Page Endnotes 180 President’s Council on Sustainable Development. 1996. Sustainable America: A New Consensus. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. From p. 12. Even after the 1996 welfare reforms, which curtailed eligibility for some immigrants, immigrant welfare use remains higher than that of natives for all four major programs and for all entering cohorts after 1970. Steven Camarota, Immigrants in the United States – 2000. Center for Immigration Studies, January, 2001. Eben Fodor. 2002. Assessment of Statewide Growth Subsidies in Oregon. Alternatives to Growth Oregon. www.agoregon.org/pdf/Subsidies_Report.pdf 2001 Metro Public Opinion Study by Davis and Hibbitts Inc., May, 2001. When asked who should pay the cost of growth, 40 percent felt developers and new home buyers should pay all of the costs associated with infrastructure, 33 percent felt new growth should pay a greater share, and 21 percent felt that the costs should be equally shared (6 percent don’t know), as cited in Fodor, 2002. Ed Lytwak. 1999. "A Tale of Two Futures: Changing Shares of U.S. Population Growth." NPG Forum Series. Washington, D.C.: Negative Population Growth. Amara Bachu. 1997. "Fertility of American Women: June 1995. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Series P20-499. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Short-term population growth, especially covering the next couple of decades, can be heavily influenced by the "population momentum" of previous growth. For example, even though native fertility has been below replacement level since 1972, it still will provide several millions more population growth over the next couple of decades because of population momentum from the high fertility of the 1950s and 1960s. Essentially, the grand-daughters of the girls born during the Baby Boom of the 1950s and 1960s will need to age out of child-bearing years before that earlier Baby Boom stops producing population growth. Thus, native fertility is a significant — although not major — cause of "short-term population growth" in the U.S. But "long-term population growth" (three decades or more down the line) will include virtually no growth resulting from the native fertility of today. The population momentum of the above-replacement-level fertility before 1972 will have run out. Virtually all population growth over the "long-term" will be the result of post-1970 immigration and high immigrant fertility. Ibid. U.S. Census Bureau. 1998. Current Population Survey. March. Of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s, 44 percent lived in central cities. That compares to 23 percent for natives. But it also means that 56 percent of new immigrants lived outside central cities. Mark Engebretson. 2000. "Suburbia Goes Global: Cultures collide outside the city limits." Utne Reader. July 8, 2000. Robert D. Manning and Anita C. Butera. 1997. "From City to Suburbs: The ‘New’ Immigration, Native Minorities, and the Post-Industrial Metropolis." The Annals of the International Institute of Sociology. Vol. 6, pp. 67-100. Ibid. "Even with jobs in suburbs, commutes get longer." Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 2003. John Johnson. February 4, 2002. "Crowded Living In California’s Open Spaces" Los Angeles Times. Census Bureau, 1998. Note 150. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, the TFR of non-Hispanic white females was 1.8 in 1997 (compared to 2.1 for replacement level). Using Census Bureau data, it can be calculated that in 1970, non-Hispanic whites comprised 83 percent of the U.S. population and accounted for approximately 78 percent of the births. By 1994, non-Hispanic whites comprised 74 percent of the population and accounted for 60 percent of the births. With immigration included (approximately 90 percent of which originates from non-European sources), the non-Hispanic white share of current population growth drops well below 50 percent. According to medium projections of the Census Bureau and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, non-Hispanic whites will account for 6 percent of the nation’s population growth between 1995 and 2050, blacks for 18 percent, Asians for 20 percent, and Hispanics for 54 percent (James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, eds. 1997. The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Table 3.7). By 2050, Non-Hispanic whites are projected to have declined to 51 percent of the U.S. population from 87 percent in 1950 (Table 3.10, The New Americans). "The Impact of New Americans: A Review and Analysis of the National Research Council’s The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration" by Steven A. Camarota and Leon Bouvier , Table 6. December 1999.www.cis.org/articles/1999/combinednrc.pdf Figures are based on the authors’ analysis of the March 1998 Current Population Survey collected by the Census Bureau. Figures for the children of immigrants are for all person born in the United States who have reported in the Survey that their mother was born in another country. The 2000 Census showed that over 80 percent of immigrants that entered in the 1990s came from under-developed countries from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Roy Beck and Leon Kolankiewicz. 2001. "Weighing Sprawl Factors in Large U.S. Cities." NumbersUSA.com. William H. Frey. 1995. "Immigration and Internal Migration ‘Flight’ from U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Toward a New Demographic Balkanization." Urban Studies. Vol. 32, No. 4-5, pp. 733-757. Robert J. Jagiello. 1992. California in Chaos: A Survival Manual. Tomorrow Books. Jonathan Tilove and Joe Hallinan. 1994. "Whites Flee Immigrants for ‘Whiter’ States." Newhouse News Service. Thomas J. Sugrue. 2003. Suburbanization and African Americans. Africana.com: The Gateway to the Black World. www.africana.com/Articles/tt_983.htm Karen De Witt. 1994. "Minorities Now Lead Exodus From Inner Cities to Suburbs." The New York Times, 15 August. Michael A. Fletcher. 1998. "In L.A. a Sense of Future Conflicts." The Washington Post. P. A1, April 7. Anon. Urban Guide: Growth Patterns from 1980 to 1990. muspin.gsfc.nasa.gov/Prime/art4txt.html Minority University Space Interdisciplinary Network NASA. No date. Glenn Fuguitt, John Fulton, and Calvin Beale. 2001. The Shifting Pattern of Black Migration From and Into the Nonmetropolitan South, 1965-1995. Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. ERS RDRR No. RDRR93. , December 2001. www.ers.usda.gov/publications/rdrr93/
|