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Can We Control the Border?
Has Operation Hold the Line at El Paso shown staying power?
Yes, it has. The deterrent effect of the strategy of 24-hour presence on the border in the most frequently crossed area has continued despite some slight lessening of the commitment of personnel to this effort. Nevertheless, El Paso is not invulnerable to renewed pressure from would-be illegal immigrants. A large jump in apprehensions in January and February this year demonstrated that the aura of impenetrability that constitutes deterrence was not sufficient to head off an influx that appears to be related to the Mexican peso devaluation crisis. Efforts to end-run the natural barrier of the Rio Grande and the fencing in central El Paso also demonstrate a need for additional physical barrier construction on the periphery of the city. As deterrence increases elsewhere, it will be important to not assume that El Paso is invulnerable and, thereby, allow it to become a weak link again.
What effect has the El Paso operation had on other Texas jurisdictions and on attempted illegal entry in New Mexico and Arizona?
The results are mixed. The New Mexico section of the El Paso sector has shown little increase of apprehensions, other than the usual seasonal fluctuation, since October 1993, when Operation Hold the Line began. But that changed at the beginning of this year, when greater pressure occurred all along the border. Although more illegal migrants may have entered at that time through New Mexico because of the El Paso operation, this cannot be demonstrated from apprehension data. In fact New Mexico apprehensions rose by less than those in the Texas portion of the jurisdiction.
Texas jurisdictions other than El Paso actually experienced a decline in the rate of increasing apprehensions (5% rather than an earlier 10% rate), but they also were hit by a major influx in January and February, when apprehensions were 27 percent higher than one year earlier. An isolated jurisdiction, like Marfa, shows little reaction to either Operation Hold the Line or to the start-of-year surge.
The Tucson sector, on the other hand, saw apprehensions increase by over 50 percent after Hold the Line began (compared to a 30% increase the previous year), and the first five months of the current fiscal year show apprehensions up by 77 percent. Yuma, by contrast, has witnessed declining apprehensions each year, including the current one. It appears that the Nogales border area has become the route of choice for intending illegal immigrants deterred by a less inviting environment in El Paso.
Is Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego demonstrating a successful strategy of deterrence?
It is showing potential. The INS insists that Operation Gatekeeper is showing successful deterrence. But this conclusion is sustained only when looking at the results in the Imperial Beach section — formerly the primary target of opportunity of the sector. There, apprehensions are down by over 40 percent, and, more significantly, the improved control appeared to be impervious to the surge in attempted crossings at the start of the year. However, the overall apprehension data for the sector reflect a more modest decline of 14 percent for the five months after the start-up of the operation. That is less significant than it seems when it is recalled that the apprehension rate also declined by 14 percent for the full fiscal year before Gatekeeper was launched. Thus, overall, Gatekeeper appears to represent continuation of improved control of the San Diego sector, rather than a dramatic new initiative. Nevertheless, if the strategy of pushing illegal crossings eastward can be solidified in Chula Vista and extended to Brown Field, there is a real prospect for seriously reducing the illegal entry flow through the San Diego sector.
What is the difference between the El Paso and San Diego operations, and what explains the difference in deterrence?
Part of the difference is in the population of illegal crossers. To the extent that the Border Patrol at El Paso was dealing primarily with crossers whose departure point was Ciudad Juárez, and whose destination was El Paso, while the Border Patrol at San Diego is dealing primarily with long-distance illegal crossers, the latter population may be expected to be more determined in their efforts. Another aspect of that difference is that it will necessarily take longer for a heightened apprehension capability to have the same deterrent effect at the source when the source is in the interior of Mexico or in Central America rather than the other side of the border.
The deployment of agents is also different. The Border Patrol's San Diego deployment of agents in a layered strategy has been attacked as more of the same policy of apprehension rather than deterrence. It contrasts with the Border Patrol agents at El Paso constituting a visible deterrence. Although there are differences in deployment, the deterrent effect of both ultimately depends on the risk of apprehension as viewed by the would-be illegal immigrant. If they both can apprehend the vast majority of illegal border crossers, they should have the same deterrent effect, with the exception that a would-be crosser from Juárez or Tijuana is more likely to give up and go home than one who has a thousand-mile trip home.
The deterrence of the physical barrier at San Diego could be further improved, as indicated in the Sandia Laboratory study cited by the General Accounting Office in testimony before the Immigration and Claims Subcommittee of the House of Representatives on March 10, 1995. One issue that should be considered is the fact that the greater de terrence at El Paso has been achieved with a chain-link fence, i.e. one through which the Border Patrol agents may be seen by intending illegal crossers, whereas the San Diego and Nogales fence construction is steel sheeting. The latter offers security for the Border Patrol from rock throwing or even shooting from the Mexican side, but it also impairs visibility for both the Border Patrol and the would-be crossers. The Border Patrol recognized that the steel fence at San Diego was installed the wrong way, and it is not making the same mistake at Nogales. The wrong way is with the corrugation ripples horizontal — so that they can be readily scaled — rather than vertical. The Border Patrol insists that the horizontal installation was an economy move because the length-wise installation would go farther.
Will greater deterrence lead to a decrease in the number of new illegal immigrants settling in the United States each year?
This is the $64,000 question. At best, the answer would be a qualified yes. The qualifications are needed because the nature of the pressures on the border are variable and because the U.S-Mexican border is not the only way that illegal immigrants enter the United States. If the INS is correct in its estimate that half of the annual net increase of 300,000 illegal immigrants are entering legally and overstaying their visas, then the challenge at the border is to reduce the net increment of 150,000 who are EWI immigrants. Some progress in this direction was probably achieved in FY-94 akin to the overall decline in apprehensions that was also registered during this period (about 19%). It is difficult to do more than guess, though, because the data show only apprehensions, not those who succeed in avoiding apprehension or those who are deterred by greater border security. Any inferences are also made risky by the shifting pattern which shows up in increased pressure on Arizona and eastern San Diego sections of the border. If the apprehension capacity of these sectors was saturated by the rerouted illegal crossers, then the apprehension rate, as a percentage of EWI crossers, would have gone down and the number of successful crossers would have increased at those points. This probably happened in Arizona, where the personnel level of effort increased by about seven percent while the apprehension rate soared by 77 percent.
But, the new pressure on the border this year as a result of the peso crisis has probably negated whatever gains may have been achieved in 1994. At the same time, it is also probably true that if the border security upgrading had not begun, the 1995 surge would leave a much greater mark on the United States than it likely has done so far.
Most importantly, the results of Operation Hold the Line and the encouraging partial results of Operation Gatekeeper indicate that real progress can be made in controlling the U.S.-Mexican border, as the remaining weak spots are reinforced. This paper is not intended to deal with whether the U.S. economy needs low-wage agricultural, domestic or sweatshop labor supplied by illegal immigrants (we think not) or the international implications of shutting off the safety valve of emigration for large numbers of unemployed Mexicans or Central Americans. We would note only that there are countervailing U.S. national interests that offset these concerns.
Was the border control mess inherited by the Clinton Administration the result of inattention by previous administrations?
Yes, but the Congress, controlled up to this year by the Democrats, shares the responsibility. Funding and authorized personnel levels have not kept pace with the challenge. The administration should have pressed for greater resources, but the Congress could also have acted, as it did last year when the Clinton Administration did not ask for as many new Border Patrol agents as appeared to be required.
A major effort to upgrade border security in San Diego was begun during the Bush Administration, although the Clinton Administration expanded it and is extending the corrugated steel fencing to Nogales and, eventually, elsewhere. The major breakthrough in border control was the demonstration of effective deterrence at El Paso. The Justice Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were only reluctantly involved with, and very slow to embrace, the positive results of that now-heralded operation. What remains to be done?
Still needed are increased physical barriers, increased personnel and a more coordinated approach to overall border management. Funding and authorized personnel levels have increased in the past two years and the current budget request is seeking still more resources. It seems clear that Congress, although it has its own priorities, also recognizes the need for additional reinforcement of the border. But this alone will address only the symptom rather than the underlying problem. The problem lies in the disparity of opportunity between the United States and the sending countries, whether Mexico or Cuba or China. It lies also in the laxity of our defense of our borders and our workplaces against illegal immigrants. Although we have limited ability to improve economic conditions abroad, beyond what we are doing already, we can do much more to reduce the attractiveness of illegal immigration by demonstrating that those who do penetrate our border security will be identified, denied jobs and sent home. causes a decline in apprehensions at interior immigration checkpoints. Similarly, if there were successful deterrence against aliens finding employment, there should be significant spill-over effects in reducing the pull factors and further ease some of the pressure on the Border Patrol.
If illegal employment is curtailed and a need for foreign workers can be demonstrated that cannot be met by Americans or legal resident aliens in the short term at attractive wages, then mechanisms exist to import those foreign workers, either permanently or temporarily. If it should prove to be correct that the economy needs unskilled foreign workers — after allowing time for market forces to resolve the shortage — the legal immigration channel should siphon off some who otherwise would attempt to enter illegally. The end result is that each of these aspects of immigration — both legal and illegal — are interrelated. Better border management is a challenge of determining where best to allocate resources in order to have the greatest success.
Finally, the Border Patrol has shown at El Paso that more effective deterrence at the border causes a decline in apprehensions at interior immigration checkpoints. Similarly, if there were successful deterrence against aliens finding employment, there should be significant spill-over effects in reducing the pull factors and further ease some of the pressure on the Border Patrol.
If illegal employment is curtailed and a need for foreign workers can be demonstrated that cannot be met by Americans or legal resident aliens in the short term at attractive wages, then mechanisms exist to import those foreign workers, either permanently or temporarily. If it should prove to be correct that the economy needs unskilled foreign workers — after allowing time for market forces to resolve the shortage — the legal immigration channel should siphon off some who otherwise would attempt to enter illegally. The end result is that each of these aspects of immigration — both legal and illegal — are interrelated. Better border management is a challenge of determining where best to allocate resources in order to have the greatest success. Too much of the discussion of border control is focussed on coping with the pressure of illegal immigration. The major challenge of controlling the flow of narcotics and other controlled substances is often forgotten. It is important to recognize that the two are related. The more out of control the border is in terms of illegal aliens, the easier it is for drug smugglers and other contrabandistas to penetrate border security. For example, the narcotic seizure rate at El Paso in FY-94 was up by 16 percent over the previous year before Hold the Line was in effect. This may be due to channelling more of the trafficking into areas easier to control.
Too much of the focus is on apprehensions, and the analysis becomes complicated by the fact that both increasing, as well as decreasing, numbers may represent success. In fact, a more reliable measure is available if the interior control points leading out of the major border crossing areas are operating effectively. Yet, the Clinton Administration's closing of the San Clemente traffic check station can only be understood as a possible precursor to closing it permanently. If that happened it would be absurd to leave open the Temecula station. If both are closed, however, the Border Patrol will have lost the primary means of evaluating the success of its border management. It is clear that the traffic check operations could be more effective, but that too, like improved border security, will be labor intensive.
The attention given to stopping the EWI illegal aliens has tended to distract attention from the fact that is only one part of the problem. Preventing alien smuggling, like preventing drug smuggling, is a recognized international responsibility. Effective measures will always be difficult as long as the United States approaches them unilaterally. Unfortunately, Mexico is not a member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is grappling with the alien smuggling issue. In an October 1994 seminar on migrant trafficking, IOM Director General James Purcell noted that, "Trafficking in migrants is a major issue facing not only governments but societies at large in the coming years. This Seminar is a first step towards taking regional and international action to deal with a problem that confronts all countries."
The administration's recent bilateral negotiations with Mexico, with the peso devaluation crisis as a backdrop, have shown that it understands the need for greater bilateral cooperation to reduce immigrant smuggling. But the problem will be to get the Mexican government to overcome its view that illegal immigration to the United States is in Mexico's best interest. In addition, the administration, the Commission on Immigration Reform, headed by Barbara Jordan, and many members of Congress have indicated their understanding that border control does not stop at the border. If illegal aliens are home free, or virtually so, once they have eluded the Border Patrol, then intending illegal immigrants will always be more determined, and the work at the border will always be more difficult. The corrective action that must be done is to deny jobs to illegal immigrants. The employer sanctions initiative begun in 1986 by IRCA must be made to work effectively. In addition, those illegal aliens who are identified at job sites or elsewhere must be fairly, but swiftly, removed from the country.
All of these measures require increased resources, as well as coordinated allocation of the resources already available. The administration's FY-96 budget request reflects a commitment to continue to strengthen control at the border. It remains to be seen whether it is prepared to make any commitment — other than a token nod toward experimenting with employment verification proposals — toward making the employer sanctions law effective. And it appeared that the administration was unprepared to increase deportations other than for criminal aliens.
That may be changing, however, given President Clinton's remarks in a radio address on May 6, 1995. He noted that it is nonsensical for law enforcement agencies not to identify illegal aliens to the INS — even though they may not be prosecuted for a crime — and for the INS not to act to secure their departure from the United States. He expressed concern also about the lack of follow-up to make sure that those who opt for voluntary departure actually leave the country. Therefore, although there are some hopeful signs, it seems clear that a comprehensive package of measures to improve border management will require additional initiatives from the Congress to fill in the missing pieces.
Recent events make clear that the American public is calling on its representatives to deal effectively with the growing problem of illegal immigration. To deliver the most effective response requires that reform efforts not be piecemeal, as has characterized earlier efforts that have left, or created, loopholes.
The problem of illegal immigration begins in the sending countries, and effective control efforts must attempt to discourage this migration before it begins. Recent efforts to involve the Mexican government in aggressively dealing with alien smugglers must be continued.
The success of border control through deterrence demonstrated in El Paso needs to continue to be spread along the border. Although the Gatekeeper operation in San Diego shows the possibility of a significant reduction in illegal entry sector-wide, that remains to be proven. If the early results at Imperial Beach cannot be maintained while greater deterrence is established at the other San Diego stations, then the Border Patrol should revise its strategy and put the agents on the border, as was done in El Paso. At the same time, increased pressure on our deterrent capability will develop — at least until the appearance of a relatively impenetrable border for illegal entry discourages would-be illegal immigrants from trying their luck at avoiding apprehension — and the Border Patrol's strength must be up to the task of so effectively apprehending illegal border crossers that it will stifle the migration before it starts.
The greatest support that the Border Patrol could receive would be effective action to reduce the attraction of our economy to the poor or simply ambitious from other countries. This can only be achieved when it is clear that employment will be denied to illegal immigrants. National interests require a climate in the country that is inhospitable to illegal entrants, not because of hostility to them, but because the needs of Americans and legal residents for jobs and services must come first. When the border is no longer out of control and job opportunities for the illegal immigrant dry up and those who still manage to get in illegally are sent back home, then annual apprehensions of over one million along the U.S.-Mexican border should become a sign of the past carelessness of the United States in managing that border. BIBLIOGRAPHY
U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Control: Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive Results, GAO/GGD-95-30, Washington, DC, December 1994.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Border Patrol, "Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond," Washington, DC, July 1994.
Martin, John L. "Operation Blockade: A Bullying Tactic or a Border Control Model?" Backgrounder, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC, December 1993.
Bean, Frank D. et al, Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States-Mexico Border: The Effects of Operation Hold-the- Line on El Paso/Juárez, Population Research Center, Univ. of Texas-Austin, July 1994.
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